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ABSTRACT 
Links between Spanish industrial relations institutions and 
performance outcomes are examined. Part I considers changes in 
various institutions since the end of the Franco period: the structure 
of collective bargaining; trade union organisation; the activities and 
structure of management; the scope of bargaining; and the extent of 
informal bargaining. It goes on to see how such changes have 
affected macroeconomic performance. Part II examines the flexibility 
of the industrial wage structure. It considers how the relative job 
performance by sector is influenced by the flexibility in the pay 
structure and by minimum wage legislation. 
• 
Introduction 
Linking industrial relations institutions to performance outcomes 
is rather popular these days, but very difficult to do properly. This 
paper focusses on two such links. Part I considers how the Spanish 
system of collective bargaining influences macroeconomic 
performance. It emphasises the importance of the coverage, level and 
co-ordination of bargaining, and the role of the state, in influencing 
macroeconomic performance. Part II concentrates on microeconomic 
efficiency by examining the link between the flexibility in the structure 
of industrial wages and relative employment. Evidence is presented 
on the industrial pay-productivity-jobs nexus and on the impact of 
minimum wage legislation on employment. 
It has to be emphasised that much of the discussion here is 
tentative. The information on changes in institutions is rather 
fragmentary. There is an urgent need for more workplace and 
company data which would permit a firmer discussion of the 
association between industrial relations institutions and outcomes. 
Commentators have noted that, over the last decade, a dichotomy 
has arisen in the Spanish labour market. One group of workers and 
firms is covered by traditional collective bargaining, while in the 
second group fixed-term contracts dominate. In any one workplace 
there may also be collective bargaining coverage with some employees 
on permanent contracts and some on fixed-term contracts. This paper 
is largely concerned with the impact of traditional collective 
bargaining. To the extent that fixed-term contracts have taken an 
important hold in Spain, the impact of collective bargaining on 
macroeconomic performance and microeconomic efficiency may have 
moderated somewhat in the last ten years. A companion paper 
analyses the contribution of the new contractual arrangements to the 
performance of the Spanish labour market. 
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PART I 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTIONS AND 
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
1. Introduction 
At the macro level the perfonnance of the labour market is a 
crucial detenninant and barometer of overall economic perfonnance. 
The main policy objective is to create the most effective pay/jobs 
trade-off whilst still providing sufficient incentives for continuous 
improvement in micro efficiency. Most commentators on labour 
markets - national, local or occupational - cite the institutions of 
different markets as particularly influential in detennining relative 
perfonnance. Particularly highlighted, is the role of industrial relations 
institutions alongside other factors such as social security laws, the 
unemployment benefit system and the provision of training. There is 
now a reasonably well-established debate on the relative merits of 
alternative industrial relations institutions which concentrates on the 
structures and role of collective bargaining. 
Four features of the industrial relations system are considered 
influential: the coverage of collective bargaining; the relative 
importance of the different levels at which collective bargaining takes 
place; the degree of coordination of collective bargaining - both intra­
and inter-party; and the role of the state. This part analyses the 
perfonnance -of the Spanish labour market in recent years in the 
context of this debate and these four areas. 
Section 2 outlines the main features of the Spanish industrial 
relations system and identifies key changes in institutions since the end 
of the Franco period in 1975. In some areas the picture is relatively 
clear, for example, on the coverage of collective bargaining, but there 
is very little infonnation on other important aspects of the system such 
as the activities of management and the degree of infonnal collective 
bargaining. Some speculation concerning the possible influence of 
particular institutional features is also included here. Section 2 
concludes by attempting to classify the Spanish system compared to 
its own past and compared to the UK system. 
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Section 3 reviews the literature on collective bargaining 
institutions and comparative economic performance. Although the 
literature has blossomed since the seminal studies by Bruno and Sachs 
(1985) and Calmfors and Driffil (1988), the debate is still relatively 
polarised in camps supporting one or the other of the two studies. 
While Bruno and Sachs found a relatively linear relationship between 
the degree of centralisation and performance, Calmfors and Driffil 
found a non-linear, hump-backed relationship with both centralised and 
decentralised economies performing better than their intermediate 
competitors. The alternative findings of the two camps hinge on the 
relative classification of different countries on the separate rankings of 
centralisation or corporatism. Section 3 concludes by suggesting that 
an alternative approach to this debate is to consider longitudinal 
information on economic performance in countries undergoing 
significant changes in collective bargaining structures. 
Finally, Section 4 attempts to draw together information from the 
preceding sections to examine the crucial question of what the debate 
on industrial relations institutions and performance implies for Spain. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, knowledge of the details rather than the 
stylised facts of Spanish industrial relations makes a definitive 
classification of the system extremely difficult, both with respect to the 
past and to other countries. This section also provides preliminary 
analysis of changes in institutions and economic performance over the 
last fifteen years. 
Policies for improving Spanish economic performance through 
changing industrial relations institutions are not immediately apparent. 
In part, this is because of rather significant knowledge and data 
insufficiencies which suggest that what Spain needs most of all is a 
thorough national survey of industrial relations practices - particularly 
at workplace and enterprise level. In the UK workplace level, 
information is provided through the three Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys (WIRS) in 1980, 1984 and 1990 and there have also 
been enterprise level surveys (for example - Marginson et ai., 1988). 
Policies to change institutions cannot be made on the basis of 
inadequate information about how the existing institutions actually 
operate at the moment. 
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2. The Post-Franco Spanish Industrial Relations System 
2.1. Introduction 
Spain is still a relatively fledgling democracy compared to other 
western European economies and therefore perhaps unsurprisingly its 
collective bargaining system is still evolving. While elements of 
Franco's highly regulated system remain - industrial level collective 
bargaining and virtually mandatory works councils - there are also 
facets of a more laissez-faire approach to industrial relations such as 
free trade unionism and a right to strike. Descriptions of the Spanish 
'system' by Lucio (1992), an International Labour Organisation 
mission (lLO, 1985) and McElrath (1989) amongst others, provide a 
quite complex picture of some seemingly contradictory industrial 
relations features. 
The remit here is to identify key changes in the collective 
bargaining system in the years of new democracy and therefore an 
overview of the practice of industrial relations. Key changes are those 
which appear to have had (or in the absence of evidence, couId have) 
a significant impact on the functioning of the system, the parties 
involved in bargaining and/or, perhaps most importantly, on labour 
market outcomes. By identifying the key changes in the Spanish 
collective bargaining system this should provide a perspective with 
which to characterise the current Spanish system and to speculate 
about possible effects on performance. 
In some areas there is an abundance of data which provides a 
detailed picture of the current state of, and changes in, the collective 
bargaining system - such as the number of workers covered by 
collective agreements at different levels of bargaining. However, in 
other important areas there is little or no reliable information. 
Disparities in the amount of information available, combined with the 
inevitable contradictions of a still evolving system, mean that the 
overall picture of change is considerably blurred. Hence conclusions 
about the characterisation of Spanish collective bargaining (initially 
with respect to the UK) is contingent on some speculation. This is 
particularly evident when trying to assess the degree of informal 
bargaining taking place outside the regulated, formal system. 
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Five areas are examined in varying degrees of detail: the 
structure of 'collective bargaining; trade union organisation; the 
activities and structures of management; the scope of bargaining; and 
finally the extent of informal bargaining. In each area the main 
features of the system and the key changes since 1975 are documented 
and briefly discussed. 
2.2. Collective bargaining structure 
Key points: 
a. Compared to under Franco collective bargaining is 
deregulated. 
b. However, the system is still highly regulatory compared to 
the UK. 
c. High and (since early 1980s) sustained level of collective 
agreement coverage. 
d. Multiplicity of bargaining levels operating simultaneously, 
but degree of duality slightly reduced from late 1980s. 
e. Attempts at concertation (social contracts) of 1977-1987 
now abandoned (though possibility of revival considered in 
1993). 
f. Increasing concentration of bargaining at industry level (by 
province or region) away from national and enterprise 
bargaining. This raises questions concerning the role of 
works councils. 
g. Little evidence, but suggestions by commentators that the 
bargaining system is more fragmented than official figures 
show. 
h. Collective bargaining rights for public administration 
workers increasingly extended especially with 1984 Law on 
Trade Union Freedom. 
Discussion: 
a. Comparisons with Franco 
Although Franco's government became increasingly less 
authoritarian in the area of industrial relations, particularly during the 
expansionary years of the 1960s (los aiios de desarrollo), the system 
has become significantly less regulated since his death in 1975. 
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Section b points out tbat despite large changes compared to tbe UK, 
tbe Spanish State still directs and regulates tbe organisation of 
collective bargaining quite extensively. There are two key areas of 
deregulation compared to under Franco. First, tbe State no longer 
intervenes directly to determine tbe outcomes of collective bargaining 
by sanctioning (or refusing to sanction) tbe contents of collective 
agreements. This has not prevented governments from attempting to 
influence pay settlements and the like, through voluntary incomes 
policies and concertation agreements witb tbe social partoers, but tbese 
have had no legal force as under Franco. The second major source of 
deregulation concerns tbe freedom of industrial relations actors to form 
independent trade unions and employers organisations. Under Franco 
legal trade unions and employers' groups were centrally organised and 
directed by tbe State for each industry. Concomitant witb tbese two 
major areas of deregulation have been a right to strike, a right to 
independent worker representation, and rights of trade union 
association for most public sector workers. 
b. Comparison with the UK 
Deregulation has not, however, seen tbe Spanish system of 
collective bargaining move towards tbe UK system of virtually 
complete freedom of action by employers witb some constraints on 
unions, in tbe name of a deregulated labour market. Altbough tbe 
State no longer seeks to directly control tbe outcomes of bargaining, 
it still sets many of tbe rules of bargaining. Note tbat in all tbe areas 
listed below, Spanish collective bargaining is significantly more 
regulated tban tbe UK's. The principal provisions of tbe legal 
framework which influence collective bargaining structure are: 
i. Workers have a right to representation through elected 
worker representatives at enterprise level - number 
elected depends on firm size. 
ii. Elections for worker representatives are held every 
four years (every two years before 1985). Elections 
are regulated by tbe State but tbere is no government 
intervention in tbe process for which unions are solely 
responsible. 
iii. In firms witb over 50 employees, worker 
representatives form a works council which is tben tbe 
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bargaining agent in tbe finn, should bargaining take 
place. 
iv. In industries witb sector agreements, tbe 'most 
representative' unions and employers' associations are 
accorded negotiation status dependent on performance 
in works councils elections (unions) and on the 
number of affiliated finns (employers' organisations). 
v. The level of bargaining is determined by the parties 
not tbe State. Note tbough, tbat tbe parties have not 
seen fit to radically change the level of (formal) 
bargaining away from tbat which operated under 
Franco. 
vi. All collective agreements have to be registered witb 
the Ministry of Labour (or regional equivalent) to 
check tbat tbey are legal (do not breach minimum or 
maximum conditions of employment on pay, hours, 
holidays etc) but not to otberwise sanction tbeir 
substantive contents. 
vii. Collective agreements are legally binding on all 
employers and employees included in tbeir remit. 
However tbese agreements only establish minimum 
terms and conditions. Employer agreements are used 
to establish over-award benefits for a significant 
minority of covered workers. 
viii. Some provision for tbe extension of agreements to 
similar but uncovered finns, but apparently rarely 
used. Estimates vary but it is likely tbat extensions 
affect less than 20 agreements a year. 
c. High coverage of collective agreements 
Presumably because of tbe legal framework summarised above, 
tbe great majority of Spanish employees have tbeir pay and conditions 
determined by collectively negotiated agreements. Recent estimates 
(Jimeno and Toharia, 1991) are tbat about 75% of employees 
(excluding public administration) are covered by at least one collective 
agreement (see Table 1 and Figure 1 for a summary of the available 
information up to 1991). Jimeno and Toharia point out that tbere are 
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problems with the official data on coverage, hence their lower 
estimated figure. Among the problems are: upward bias from double 
counting since some workers are covered by both enterprise and 
sector/region agreements and because estimates are those of the 
bargaining parties; and downward bias because some agreements are 
not included in the calculation (for instance two year agreements are 
not recorded in the second year). Moreover some data points do not 
include information on the most industrialised regions of Catalonia and 
the Basque Country. 
Despite these problems it is readily apparent that collective 
bargaining coverage is extremely high in Spain especially relative to 
the low level of trade union density (see Section 3). The 
characteristics of finns and workers in the small non-collective 
bargaining sector is relati vel y undocumented apart from that by the 
industrial sector. Coverage is lower in agriculture, the food industry, 
transportation, personal services and hotels and catering. Jimeno and 
Toharia suggest that the lack of an updated census of firms is one of 
the main reasons for the absence of representation at some enterprises. 
It therefore also seems probable that non-covered firms are likely to 
be quite small, relatively new firms and possibly located in less 
developed areas. 
The official data suggests that after a large increase in the 
proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining in the late 
1970s, the proportion has remained relatively stable over the 1980s 
and into the early 1990s. There appears to be something of a data blip 
in the series at 1981 showing an improbably large dip in coverage. 
This data is reported at face value in Table I but Figure 1 also 
describes a more credible progression between 1980 and 1982. 
Comparisons of coverage pre and post 1975 are not very sensible since 
collective bargaining was not free from government interference before 
1975. 
d. Multiplicity of bargaining levels 
In the fifteen or so years of democratic government, 
collective bargaining in Spain has operated at all four of the following 
levels: workplace; enterprise; sector (usually by province or region); 
and national. It seems that in large part these levels have been 
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functioning concurrently rather than consecutively. Most 
commentators would identify Spain with the Donovan description of 
British industrial relations circa the late 19608 - fonnalised multi­
employer bargaining, occasionally directed by national incomes 
policies or in Spain's case 'framework agreements', and supplemented 
by enterprise and/or workplace bargaining - leading to wage drift. 
Although data on the coverage and levels of collective bargaining 
appears to be quite comprehensive - breakdown of the data is also 
available by sector and region - the absence of survey data does make 
assessing in exact detail the relative importance of different levels of 
bargaining quite difficult. 
e. Increasing dominance of multi-employer bargaining? 
Table 2 and Figure I provide a summary of the best available 
infonnation on the relative importance of enterprise and multi­
employer bargaining at sector level, in tenns of the proportion of 
covered employees in each category. Although there are still a large 
number of enterprise agreements (and indeed the number of 
agreements has increased), the proportion of covered workers under 
them declined from around 20% in 1980 to 15% by 1990. There is 
some debate about whether or not this decline is significant, since it 
occurred maiuly in the early part of the 19808 and since then the 
relative importance of company bargaining has remained relatively 
constant. Some commentators have also suggested that the relative 
importance of multi-employer agreements is overstated by the official 
figures, since in reality employers' associations can ouly guess at the 
number of employees directly affected by a sectoral or regional 
collective agreement. 
Note that the official data records enterprise and workplace 
agreements in the same category, but although it is not possible to 
distinguish them in the data most commentators state that workplace 
agreements are uncommon. This slight shift to sector level bargaining 
from finn level, combined with the abandonment of framework 
agreements after 1986, indicates that there have been concurrent moves 
of both centralisation and decentralisation in Spanish collective 
bargaining. 
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r. Concertation abandoned 
Table 3 provides information on various attempts at concertation 
between the social partners in the last fifteen years. Although there 
has been no economy-wide agreement since 1986, such high level 
agreements were a regular occurrence in the earlier years of 
democratic government. Each of the agreements was relatively ad hoc 
and each involved different combinations of the social partners, which 
presumably made enforcement of voluntary restraint somewhat 
difficult There was apparently no attempt to establish formal tri- or 
bi-partite bargaining institutions at national level to match the bi­
partite ones at sector level. 
Most commentators suggest that there was fairly unanimous 
support for the abandonment of concertation agreements among 
unions, employers and government - though it is not clear whether this 
was because the agreements were not working or because all sides 
wanted more flexibility at lower levels. The fact that the absence of 
concertation agreements has not been accompanied by a 
decentralisation of bargaining from sector to firm level (see next point) 
suggests that flexibility may not have been the main motivation. 
Jimeno and Toharia (1991) contend that concertation still exists 
implicitly in Spain, since the end of formal national agreements has 
not led to widening of the pay distribution which might have been 
expected. They argue that although bargaining has shifted to the arena 
of sector agreements - because parties still look to macroeconomic 
factors, particularly expected inflation, when negotiating pay 
settlements - a form of coordination emerges. If this is the case then 
it could suggest that the level at which bargaining takes place may be 
less important than the degree of coordination of pay negotiations. 
Note that after the perhaps unexpected survival of the Gonzalez 
administration after the 1993 election, the government sought a three 
year "social pact" to rein back pay settlements with the two main 
unions and the Confederaci6n de Organizaciones Empresariales de 
Espana (CEOE) for the first time since 1986. This may be in part a 
reflection of the apparent failure to engender voluntary wage restraint 
through the ERM. At the time of writing, it appears that this initiative 
has failed (Financial Times, 28.10.93). Prime Minister Gonzalez has 
stated that even in the absence of a "social pact" his government will 
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still push through labour reforms including a relaxation of hiring and 
firing laws and the decentralisation of collective bargaining (Financial 
Times. 11.10.93). 
g. Fragmentation 
Despite the official data, some recent commentators have 
suggested that in reality the Spanish system is more fragmented and 
informal than this data reveals. It is not clear on what basis these 
opinions are formed. Purely speculating, one possibility concerns the 
activities of works councils in enterprises covered by sector 
agreements. There appears to be no legislation which limits the 
activities of these bodies in such a situation and it may be that they 
are conducting informal and over-award negotiations at enterprise level 
which is not recorded in official data on collective bargaining, but is 
picked up in the extent of wage drift above sector-based settlements. 
However, as discussed in Section 2.4., assessing the degree of 
informality from data on wage drift is very difficult since it could also 
be the result of individual employers' decisions to pay over-award 
increases for reasons other than informal collective bargaining. 
h. Public administration 
Collective bargaining for employees in publicly owned 
enterprises is governed by the same legislation as the private sector. 
However, public administration has specific regulations on, for 
example, union membership. collective bargaining rights and rights to 
strike. Most commentators choose to concentrate on the private sector 
and therefore there appears to have been no recent English language 
commentary on industrial relations in public administration. The 
report of the ILO' s 1984 mission to Spain discusses relaxation of 
restrictions governing some public administration workers to bring 
their rights more into line with the private sector. It is not clear how 
far this deregulation has progressed. 
2.3. Trade union organisation 
Key points: 
a. Very low density after short-lived surge in membership in 
1977-78. 
-16-
b. Dominance of two largest union confederations maintained 
but rise of public sector unions after 1984. Duopoly may 
be more harmful than single peak union organisation. 
c. Unions appear more akin to political parties than traditional 
(stereotypical) worker organisations. 
d. Multi-unionism widespread but its effect is probably 
mollified through single table bargaining. 
e. Craft versus general unions not allowed to become an issue 
because of laws over representation rights. 
f. Closed shop illegal and apparently not an issue. 
g. Incorporation: difficult to decide whether it is union 
leaders, the government or employers who are incorporated. 
Discussion: 
a. Union density 
There is no legal requirement on unions to disclose their 
membership figures which means that estimates of union density have 
an even larger margin of error than might otherwise be the case. 
Density figures are based on self-reporting by unions at periodic 
intervals, and appear not to have been verified by survey data on 
individuals or employers. There is consensus, however, on the fact 
that union density has declined considerably since its post-Franco peak 
in 1978 at around, or just over, 50% of the employed workforce 
(Lawler and Rigby, 1986, p.254). The ILO mission put density in 
1984 at between 15 and 25%, and more recent estimates suggest that 
this declined further to between 10 and 15% by the end of the decade. 
There are various explanations for the decline including: unfulfilled 
expectations of democracy, a legal framework which negates the need 
for membership; lack of workplace union organisation to aid 
recruitment; a vicious circle of weak unionism; the virtual absence of 
check -off arrangements. At the very least we can say that if trade 
union strength is an important influence on economic performance in 
Spain, that strength is not derived from high union density. Trade 
union strength is orchestrated through legally regulated collective 
bargaining which predominantly operates at sector level. 
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b. Duopoly unionism 
The dominant factor of trade unionism in Spain is the duopoly 
of the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and the Vni6n General de 
Trabajadores (VGn since the fall of Franco. Their relative strengths 
and degree of influence compared to other unions and each other is 
best gauged by results in works councils elections since 1978 -
collated in Table 4. It is clear that the influence of the two 
confederations has increased over the 1980s such that they jointly 
gained over 80% of the votes in the 1990 elections. Relative to each 
other, the VGT overtook the CCOO over the course of the 1980s, 
perhaps in spite of its association with and support for the PSOE 
government up to 1988. Whilst the development of this dual system 
is inherently interesting, in the context of collective bargaining and 
economic performance the existence of two peak worker organisations 
rather than one, could be a contributory factor in the poor pay­
unemployment trade-off performance of Spain over the 1980s. 
Although the CCOO and VGT jointly encompass a high proportion of 
the working population, if they are operating competitively this may 
have hindered (and might continue to hinder) the operation of a 
centralised collective bargaining system. 
c. Unions as political parties 
The system of worker representative elections seems to have 
created unions which act more as political parties than more "typical" 
trade unions elsewhere - as in the UK. Trade union strength in Spain 
derives, as with political parties (in a democracy), from performance 
in elections rather than necessarily the level of membership - although 
presumably there may be positive effects on the former if membership 
is high and/or well-organised. Changes to the law on works councils' 
elections in 1984 would appear to have accentuated the concern with 
electoral performance for unions: a lengthening of the electoral cycle 
from two to four years; and new rules goveming which unions are 
entitled to negotiate at sector level depending on electoral 
performance. Vnion leaders, as politicians, may be less accountable, 
may be more likely to offer and perhaps press for higher than efficient 
terms and conditions, and may be less aware of the implications of 
their actions than in other settings. 
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d. Multi-unionism and single table bargaining 
A Spanish employer cannot choose, unlike his UK counterpart, 
to recognise only one union for collective bargaining or indeed not to 
recognise a union at all, since the system of worker representative 
elections has ensured multi-union presence on works councils and on 
the majority of sector level negotiating bodies. Table 5 gives some 
indication of the degree of multi-union representation in collective 
bargaining institutions, suggesting that around 60-70% of enterprise 
agreements and nearly all sector agreements involve more than one 
union. 
The issue of multi-unionism has received some empirical 
attention in the UK recently, though there is a general lack of 
theoretical basis for the findings. Machin et al. (1993) have 
investigated the effect of multi-unionism on pay, financial perfonnance 
and the incidence of industrial action using data from the 1984 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. They found that when 
multiple unions bargain separately they are associated with higher pay, 
poorer financial perfonnance and a greater likelihood of strike action 
than other unionized establishments. However, that research also 
suggests that these effects are mitigated when multiple unions 
negotiate jointly with management rather than separately. Metcalf et 
al. (1993) find a similar result on strike action over pay settlements 
using data from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Pay 
Databank survey covering UK manufacturing in the 1980s. 
A priori it seems unlikely that multi-unionism has an important 
part to play in explaining Spain's poor aggregate real wage flexibility, 
since although mUlti-unionism is widespread it is almost always 
accompanied by single table bargaining. Even though single table 
bargaining depends nominally on the establishment of a joint 
bargaining position between the various unions (McElrath, 1989). 
apparently this is rarely the case. So it may well be that at both 
enterprise and sector level, the potentially harmful effects of multiple 
unionism are mollified by single table bargaining. However this 
conclusion is pure speculation in the absence of infonnation about the 
mechanics of enterprise and workplace bargaining. 
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e. Craft versus general unions 
Small, craft or professional unions do exist in Spain (see Lawler 
and Rigby, 1986, inter alia, for details) but again the legislative 
framework on collective bargaining rights prevents them gaining a 
strong voice at the most intportant, sector level negotiations. The rules 
regarding 'most representative' union status stipulate that a union must 
gain at least 10% of the works council delegates or staff 
representatives nationwide (or 15% in a particular region if the union 
is regionally based) to be able to negotiate on the relevant sector 
bodies. Consequently the craft versus general union issue which 
particularly affected (afflicted) British trade unionism in the 1960s and 
1970s is not significant in Spain. Having said this, it may be that the 
conflict between skilled and unskilled workers' interests is played out 
by informal, and therefore unrecorded means at workplace or 
enterprise level. Again this is an area where reliance on official data 
may provide an unreliable picture of industrial relations in Spain and 
highlights once again the need for a Spanish WIRS or perhaps a Firm­
leve/Industrial Relations Survey (FIRS). 
f. Closed shop 
The closed shop is illegal in Spain and it does not appear to have 
ever been an issue since 1975 (or before then). However, a related 
matter is that of 'solidarity contributions' - a levy on non-union 
members who are covered by union bargained collective agreements -
which has been proposed as a means both to strengthen precarious 
union finances and to tax free-riders. (One justification for the post­
entry closed shop is to prevent free-riders on collective bargaining.) 
Although solidarity contributions are now permissable in Spain (they 
were illegal at one time) they can only be levied voluntarily. It seems 
unlikely that legislation will be altered to legalize the closed shop or 
compulsory solidarity contributions. 
g. Incorporation 
There is a belief among some British commentators on industrial 
relations that in the 1970s and early 1980s shop stewards were 
incorporated into management, such that the former were more likely 
to espouse the opinions and values of the latter than of the workers 
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they were supposedly representing. A recent dissenting voice has 
claimed that in fact management was incorporated into the shop 
stewards' way of thinking in the 1970s and that the 1980s and 1990s 
have witnessed the 'de-incorporation' of management (Dunn, 1993). 
This debate appears to be an interesting means to characterize the 
nature of and changes in the industrial relations systems in different 
countries. A priori it seems straightforward to argue that in the 
Spanish case union leaders have been incorporated into a sector-based 
bargaining system and therefore pay little regard to the opinions and 
attitudes of workers. However, it may also or instead be employers' 
group leaders who are incorporated into the value system and attitudes 
of trade union leaders, although the fact that few individual employers 
have broken away from sector agreements suggests that this is 
unlikely. This area deserves greater attention, in particular towards 
some means of testing the extent and effects of incorporation. 
One point of particular interest concerns the employer 
representatives on sector level agreements. It appears that large 
employers are more likely to be represented on sectoral negotiating 
bodies than smaller employers. These large employers probably have 
somewhat different interests from smaller employers and may be more 
willing to collude with unions over pay to the detriment of flexibility. 
2.4. Management 
Key points: 
a. Main employer organisation apparently strong but 
conflicting reports. 
b. Importance of small firms. 
c. No mention of anti-trade union practices except for 
underground economy. 
d. Little good data on human resource management 
e. Multinationals: some information on extent of inward 
investment but little on employment practices of these 
firms. 
f. Generally inadequate information on the activities of 
management in this area. 
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Discussion: 
Perhaps unsurprisingly there seems to be very little information 
on the organisation, attitudes and practices of Spanish management in 
respect of industrial relations. There are some broad themes suggested 
in the literature but insufficient data to substantiate the points. Here 
again a problem arises from the reliance on officially recorded data on 
registered agreements for information on collective bargaining. 
a. The role of the main employers organisation 
The role and importance of employers' associations has received 
fairly minimal - and then mainly descriptive - attention in industrial 
relations. The literature concentrates on analysing the origins of such 
organisations, their internal structures and their functions in relation to 
members (inter alia, Sisson, 1987 and Windmuller and Gladstone, 
1984), rather than on predicting or measuring their effects on 
economic outcomes. There seems to be some agreement between 
commentators that the role of such associations in multi-employer 
collective bargaining depends wholly on the support of member firms 
rather than on compulsion. Such firms favour higher level bargaining 
over pay and conditions in order to "neutralise trade union activity at 
workplace level" (Sisson). In the UK's case the breakdown of multi­
employer bargaining from the late 1960s came about because it was 
seen as no longer neutralising shop steward activity. 
Most of the English language descriptions of Spanish industrial 
relations ignore the role of individual employers or of management 
and instead concentrate on the role of the CEOE - the peak employers' 
organisation. Over 90% of employers in Spain are members of the 
CEOE, from all sectors, regions, private and public, small and large, 
and whether Spanish or foreign owned. The CEOE is actually a 
confederation of around 50 sectoral and 100 territorial employers' 
groups, such that many firms will have a double affiliation to the 
CEOE through a sector and a territorial body. 
What is perhaps more important than the structure of the CEOE, 
is its role in collective bargaining - the extent to which it is able to 
direct affiliates in order to coordinate pay settlements and its ability to 
enforce compliance with sectorally agreed changes in terms and 
conditions. Lucio (1992) states that compared to other areas of 
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operation the CEOE has been more "directive" in areas of industrial 
relations but that the loose confederate structure has sometimes created 
problems of enforcement. An example was the National Construction 
Confederation's over-award payment of 2.5 percentage points above 
the CEOE's recommendations in 1990. McElrath (1989) states that 
the degree to which affiliates follow the CEOE's directives in 
bargaining is simply not known. He also suggests that small and 
medium sized firms have been pushing for more decentralisation 
within CEOE but states that the extent to which this is occurring or 
even has occurred, is not clear. Presumably the extent of wage drift 
away from CEOE guidelines would be a good measure of the 
influence and strength of the employers' association. Either way there 
does seem to be some case for arguing that Spain has followed other 
developed countries in favouring multi-employer bargaining in order 
to prevent extensive trade union activity at workplace level. However, 
should trade unions gain a stronger foothold at workplace level, then 
individual employers may increasingly break away from the multi­
employer framework to bargain directly with unions. 
h. The importance of small firms 
According to Sisson et al. (1991, p.97), compared to other EC 
countries, Spain has the highest proportion of workers (41 %) in small 
firms (i.e. under 10 employees) and the lowest proportion (8%) in 
firms with more than 500 workers. The industrial relations of small 
and medium sized firms in Spain has been investigated by Miguelez 
(1988) but he does not provide (presumably because of inadequate 
extant data sources) a particularly illuminating picture of how such 
firms' practices or structures differ from larger enterprises. Lucio 
(1992) states that the predominance of small-scale enterprise "means 
that their industrial relations and personnel practices are the prevalent 
pattern", however, without substantive data it is not clear how this 
conclusion is reached (Lucio quotes an article in Spanish by Prieto c. 
1991, but does not detail Prieto's data source). 
c. Anti·trade union practices 
Although not explicitly discussed there do not appear to be 
widespread anti-trade union practices (and therefore presumably 
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attitudes) amongst management Estivill and de la Hoz (1991) state 
that there are two main reasons for a general absence of such practices 
in Spain: first. union organisation at workplace level is so weak that 
unions are not a significant threat to managerial prerogatives; and 
second, anti-trade union practices would effectively be anti-works 
councils practices and therefore illegal. There is no Spanish 
equivalent of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) union 
recognition elections, through which employers can legitimately pursue 
anti-union policies. There are two illegal ways in which employers 
could pursue anti-union policies. First, by non-compliance with 
sectoral collective agreements. A second and quite prevalent means 
of avoiding unions and legislation on worker representation is through 
the black economy. However, it may be very difficult to determine 
what influence the practices of unions and govemment labour 
legislation have had on the growth of the informal economy. 
d. Human resource management (HRM) 
Human resource management techniques emphasize the 
individual worker, workplace or company at the expense of collective 
organisation. The techniques include: employee involvement, for 
example through a greater voice for workers and better 
communications; performance appraisal; and payment systems which 
focus on individual merit and company performance. There is little 
good data on HRM practices in Spain. A couple of the more recently 
published overviews on Spanish industrial relations assert that there 
has been some growth in the use of HRM practices (Lucio, 1992, 
Estivill and de la Hoz, 1991) largely through the influence of multi­
nationals. Neither study suggests that these developments are 
widespread or that they threatened the established worker 
representative system, and moreover neither study is able to supply 
empirical estimates of the development of HRM. This is hardly 
surprising given that debate still rages about how to define HRM in 
theory, let alone how to identify it in operation, and that data at 
enterprise level is scarce. 
There is one comparative study which has examined the 
development of HRM across the EC using data from the Price 
Waterhouse Cranfield project on the HRM practices of large firms 
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(over 200 employees). Filella (1991) asks whether there is a 'Latin 
model of HRM'. His conclusions are fairly unconvincing mainly 
because he does not discuss the representativeness of the data and 
some of the results are ambiguous. For example, one finding is that 
80% of Spanish managers said that unions had become more 
influential over the last three years, compared to an average of around 
50% of other EC managers. This is a fairly broad question which 
could be interpreted in a host of different ways - does it mean 
influential in the firm, in the industry, in political life? Is this a 
positive or a normative response? And most importantly, what's the 
benchmark? Filella does not provide even simple data on the relative 
use of HRM practices across the different EC countries. 
e. Multinationals 
Buckley and Artisien (1988) document the importance of inward 
investment by multinational firms in the major Spanish manufacturing 
industries but there is apparently little known about the impact of these 
firms on the management of industrial relations. Lucio (1992) states 
that the multinationals were among the first firms to develop informal 
bargaining under Franco, and that there is some evidence that they are 
also at the forefront of introducing HRM practices such as quality 
circles and performance related pay. Again hard data is very difficult 
to come by. 
f. Generally little information on the activities of management in 
this area 
Assessment of the role of management structures, organisation 
and strategies connected to industrial relations in Spain is made 
extremely difficult because of the dearth of reliable information on 
these issues. In many ways the study of Spanish industrial relations 
is now at the stage that the study of the UK system was in the late 
1960s/early 1970s. The focus is all on the structures and institutions 
of collective bargaining and on the role of trade unions within those. 
In the UK some analysis of the management of human resources is 
seen as fundamental to any understanding of industrial relations as a 
whole. AIl the points discussed in this section result in 
unsubstantiated conclusions because of this lack of information on the 
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industrial relations practices of Spanish management (apart from that 
which is officially recorded in industrial and enterprise collective 
agreements). Perhaps the Cranfield Price Waterhouse project will 
produce more reliable and interesting data than has been published to 
date. However, first impressions of the data collected are not 
favourable. 
2.5. Bargaining scope 
Key points: 
a. Conflicting evidence but some suggestion that the scope of 
agreements was reduced in 1980s. 
b. If true, this suggests management is either deciding issues 
unilaterally or is informally negotiating changes at 
workplace level. 
Discussion: 
a. Scope of agreements 
There is not a great deal of discussion of bargaining scope in the 
studies of Spanish industrial relations. The ILO Mission Report 
(1985) provides details on the scope of the 1983 framework agreement 
(AI) which was extremely comprehensive, covering: pay; 
productivity; hours of work; absenteeism; the structure of collective 
bargaining; the promotion of employment; health and safety; and trade 
union rights. The ILO report also states that this, like other 
framework agreements, formed merely the starting point for sector and 
enterprise level bargaining. More recently commentators state that the 
scope of bargaining has reduced to concentrate on pay and hours 
(Estivill and de la Hoz, 1991; Lucio, 1992). If true this is concomitant 
with the decentralisation of bargaining away from economy-wide 
agreements. One elucidation of the reduction in bargaining scope 
(particularly to exclude employment promotion) could be that whilst 
at national level unions were prepared to trade wage increases for 
promises of economic stimuli to raise employment, at non-national 
levels the trade-off is less immediate and apparent. 
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b. How are formerly bargained issues now decided? 
In the UK there has been a reduction in bargaining scope over 
the last decade with the resultant corollary that managers are now 
much more likely to be taking decisions independently of unions and 
collective bargaining over working practices and arrangements. 
Although this may also be the case in Spain, it could be that many of 
the issues which were formerly bargained over collectively in the 
formal settings are now being bargained over informally at workplace 
level. This could be one explanation for the Cranfield Price 
Waterhouse survey results on the proportion of Spanish managers 
reporting an increase in union influence. Again this is an area which 
may prove especially difficult to illuminate. 
2.6. Formality and informality 
Key points: 
a. Not clear how to judge the extent of informal bargaining at 
workplace. 
b. Contradiction: commentators say fragmented bargaining in 
an environment of low unionisation and little workplace 
organisation - so who are managers negotiating with? 
c. Need for information on workplace bargaining. 
Discussion: 
a. Measuring the extent of informal bargaining 
One means of testing the degree of informal bargaining is to 
measure the extent of wage drift, and particularly changes in the level 
of wage drift as the locus of bargaining has shifted to sector level. 
There are problems with this outcome measure, however, since factors 
other than informal bargaining could be responsible for wage drift. 
These include efficiency wages for skilled workers and the 
insider/outsider problem. One measure of the extent of workplace 
(and presnmably informal) bargaining is the Cranfield Price 
Waterhouse project data Hegewisch (1991) reports on the level of 
"basic pay determination in the private sector for manual workers" 
across various European countries. While 61 % of the 259 Spanish 
firms surveyed, report that the industry or region is the level at which 
basic pay is determined, 2 1  % and 17% cite the enterprise and 
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workplace respectively (8% say individual level). This suggests that 
workplace bargaining is not as uncommon as some other authors 
suggest. Moreover Hegewisch's data concerns only 'basic pay 
determination' rather than total remuneration including bonuses and 
the like. Without adequate data it is very difficult to accurately judge 
the extent of workplace bargaining. But at the very least the Cranfield 
data suggests more decentralisation than the official data. 
b. The contradiction of fragmented bargaining and low 
un ionisation 
There is something of an anomaly in the assertion by some 
commentators that Spanish collective bargaining is far more informal 
and fragmented than the official data suggests in an environment of 
low unionisation and weak or non-existent workplace organisation. It 
does beg the question of who management is conducting this informal 
bargaining with. Perhaps the worker representatives have become like 
shop stewards who do not require the support of well organised union 
structures to exert pressure on management on behalf of their fellow 
employees. Presumably these representatives must be performing 
some function where formal collective bargaining is taking place at 
multi-employer level. 
2.7. Characterising the Spanish industrial relations system 
Although all sorts of changes in the Spanish industrial relations 
system are fascinating and no doubt important for explaining different 
aspects of economic performance, for the purposes of this paper four 
areas are of crucial importance. 
a. The coverage of collective bargaining 
Both relative to other Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) economies and its recent history, the 
coverage of collective bargaining is very high in Spain and has 
remained high since the early 1980s. This contrasts markedly with the 
UK which has witnessed an enormous decline in coverage especially 
since the mid-1980s such that as from 1990 (at the latest) the UK 
became a predominantly non-unionised economy. 
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b. The levels of collective bargaining 
The debate over the consequences of collective bargaining 
structures on economic perfonnance revolves much more around the 
relative importance of different levels of bargaining, than overall 
coverage. Unfortunately the Spanish experts on collective bargaining 
worry that the data on relative importance does not provide an 
accurate picture of changes that have taken place. In other words 
although the data suggests a simultaneous decentralisation away from 
economy-wide bargaining down to sector level bargaining (by region) 
and a centralisation from company to sector bargaining - the experts 
believe that company bargaining has actually increased in importance. 
This all matters rather a lot since detennining what the structure of 
collective bargaining looks like and how it has changed is a crucial 
building block towards understanding the impact (if any) of such 
changes on perfonnance. 
c. Coordination 
Prima facie the degree of coordination between the social 
partners has declined since the mid-1980s after the end of national 
bargaining pacts. In tenns of intra-party coordination, it does appear 
that whilst the main two trade unions have maintained internal 
coordination through control of sector level bargaining, employer 
coordination (if it ever existed) is quite weak. These are the stylised 
facts regarding coordination but there is a stark need for more 
infonnation on intra-party negotiations and means of agreement 
enforcement. Either way, it does appear that Spain still has a more 
coordinated collective bargaining system than the UK where neither 
unions nor employers are at all coordinated. 
d. The role of the state 
Although the state no longer has to ratify the contents of 
collective agreements, compared to the UK the Spanish industrial 
relations system is still highly regulated. Without doubt the most 
important feature in this respect are the legal props for collective 
bargaining in tenns of the rights to union representation through union 
elections for a large majority of workers. By providing a guarantee 
of union recognition, the state removes what some might regard as a 
basic liberty of the employer - to choose whether or not to recognize 
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a trade union. The Spanish system could be described as a 
circumscribed, voluntarist system in which the employer and union 
have considerable freedom to operate but no freedom to choose 
whether or not they bargain with each other in the first place. 
3. Collective Bargaining Institutions and Labour Market 
Performance 
3.1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s a number of economists have considered the 
comparative influence of different collective bargaining systems on 
labour market and macroeconomic performance. Bruno and Sachs 
(1985) set the terms for the debate in their analysis of the performance 
of 17 OECD economies up to 1979, by employing an index of 
corporatism as one explanatory variable concerned with the institutions 
of industrial relations. The political sociologists had already suggested 
that the degree of corporatism of individual countries' collective 
bargaining systems was a key factor in explaining different records of 
industrial conflict (Crouch 1985) but for economists this was relatively 
novel ground. Since 1985 there have been a number of comparative 
studies examining this issue, using various performance measures and 
alternative indices to delineate types of bargaining system. This 
section distils the evidence from 14 such studies, examining their key 
findings. the points of debate between authors in the area and the 
implications of their results. 
The theoretical link between collective bargaining systems and 
macro performance is well known - turning on the negative 
externalities of disaggregated bargaining. If bargaining takes place at 
the national level, the parties are aware of the implications of any pay 
settlement for prices (and therefore real wages). for growth and for 
employment/unemployment. In an environment of non-national 
bargaining, bargainers operating at a more decentralised level will be 
less concerned about the wider implications of their pay settlement and 
pay leapfrogging is more likely. Newell and Symons (1987) state that 
the centralisation and performance concept is directly analogous to the 
analysis of cartels, in that given pay restraint by all other bargainers, 
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there is an incentive for individual groups to cheat by breaking away 
from the centrally set norm. 
Virtually all of the empirical studies on this subject fall into two 
distinctive groups: those like Bruno and Sachs who find a linear (and 
positive) relationship between corporatist (or centralised) institutions 
and superior performance; and those who discern a non-linear 
relationship (a hump or U-shaped relationship), such that both highly 
centralised (corporatist) and highly decentralised (non-corporatist) 
economies perform well compared to their intermediate counterparts. 
The most well known study suggesting the latter relationship is by 
Calmfors and Driffil (1988). The principal explanation for the 
contradictory findings of the two sets of studies centres on the 
different means of ranking institutional forms. In particular, the 
specific ranking of certain, high performing economies on the three or 
four scales which have been developed is the key to the different 
results obtained. 
The debate appears to have reached something of a stalemate, 
since there is no objective means of choosing which is the most 
appropriate or accurate method of scoring the degree of corporatism 
or centralisation. Therefore critiques tend to focus on subjective 
assessments of the individual scales employed. Moreover, it is always 
possible to argue that an individual country is ranked incorrectly on an 
individual scale even if the most suitable scale could be agreed upon. 
Therefore attempting to produce another, more acceptable ranking of 
national bargaining systems will not provide a way forward in this 
area A judgement on whether the linearites or the non-linearites are 
correct depends on an initial assessment of the credibility of the 
alternative rankings used. 
However, this debate could be progressed in another way by 
examining the effect on performance of changes in the collective 
bargaining institutions of individual countries. A disappointing feature 
of all but one of the studies summarised here is that they do not take 
account of changes in national systems. Instead, it is implicitly 
assumed that each economy's relative ranking remains fixed over the 
period of study even if data is taken from a reasonably long time 
period. The UK is not alone in undergoing enormous changes in its 
collective bargaining system since the 1970s (and indeed in the 1970s) 
yet the possible impact of these changes is more or less ignored in the 
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majority of the studies. The whole debate about collective bargaining 
systems and perfonnance could be given fresh impetus by examining 
economic perfonnance in individual countries over two or three 
decades, taking account of important changes in the institutions of 
collective bargaining. 
3.2. Characterising national collective bargaining systems 
The starting point for all these studies is a bargaining institutions 
measure which pennits a meaningful categorization of the various 
OECD economies. Five ranking scales are shown in Table 6 and the 
accompanying notes explain the construction of each scale. There 
have been two main approaches, assessing respectively the degree of 
corporatism and the degree of bargaining centralisation. The 
distinction is more than mere semantics since the alternative 
linear/non-linear findings depend heavily on the different rankings 
produced by the corporatism and centraIisation scales. Moreover the 
basis of Calmfors and Driffil' s argument against Bruno and Sachs and 
others is that their corporatism measure obscures as much as it reveals 
about the impact of labour market institutions. 
Crouch, and Tarantelli (1986) have each produced indices of 
corporatism - although they are based on similar dimensions. 
Calmfors and DriffIi developed an alternative centraIisation index. 
The latter authors argue that their index is superior to either of the 
corporatism indices since it is less subjective than measures of 
corporatism and that the mechanisms which affect the functioning of 
the labour market are more easily understood in reference to their 
index rather than the alternatives. On the other hand those favouring 
the corporatism measures would argue that Calmfors and DriffIi's 
scale is too limiting and does not take account of consensual 
tendencies in some countries even in the absence of institutions of 
national bargaining. 
Crouch's corporatism index was first used in an economics 
setting by Bruno and Sachs such that in the economics literature it has 
become synonymous with them rather than Crouch. The index is the 
sum of scores (0, I or some indetenninate point in between) on four 
indicators: the extent of union movement centraIisation 
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(centralised=!); of shop-floor autonomy (low=!); of employer 
coordination (high=I); and the presence of works councils (yes=I). 
Bruno and Sachs provide a ranking based on this index of 17 OECD 
countries with Austria, (West) Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden as clearly corporatist economies and at the non-corporatist 
lower end the US, Canada and Australia. Tarantelli's index is quite 
similar except that he ranks countries on only three characteristics: the 
degree of 'neocooption' of trade unions and employers' organisations 
(covering both the degree of political consensus and the level of 
integration and cooperation of social partners with the machinery of 
government); the degree of bargaining centralisation; and the 
'neoregulation' of industrial conflict (extent of dispute procedure 
provision). Each country is scored from I to 5 on each indicator (very 
low through to very high) and the sum of these scores determines their 
respective rankings. The resultant scale is reasonably similar to 
Crouch's except that Japan is ranked much higher (just after Austria 
and Germany and before the Scandinavian countries), and Italy and the 
UK rank bottom of the corporatist pile - considerably lower than either 
the US or Canada 
Compared to both these indices, Calmfors and Driffil's scale is 
more simple, concerning itself only with the degree of bargaining 
centralisation. This is estimated as the sum of two scores on: the 
extent of coordination within national union and employer federations; 
and the number of parallel central organisations (on each 'side') and 
the degree of cooperation between them. The resulting scale ranks 
Germany, Japan and Switzerland much lower than their respective 
rankings on the corporatism scales. What in effect Ca1mfors and 
Driffil are estimating with the first indicator is the degree of 
centralisation, and with the second some degree of consensus or 
cooperation. On closer examination of their centralisation ranking it 
is clear that the first of these two dimensions is doing the work. Only 
the US and Canada score a lowly I on the second dimension with all 
other countries scoring 2 or 3. By comparison, there is a more 
obvious polarisation on the first indicator with half the countries 
scoring I or less, and half scoring 2 or more. It seems odd that 
Calmfors and Driffil give the two dimensions equal weight when they 
are particularly interested in investigating the impact of centralisation. 
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A clear-cut example of this problem is provided by the UK. It 
achieves the lowest ranking of all 17 countries on the first dimension 
(0+) because bargaining is so decentralised, and a 3 on the second 
because there is only one peak organisation for both labour and 
capital. Given that the first dimension indicates that there is no 
coordination (i.e. centralisation) of bargaining within either of these 
bodies (Trades Union Congress (TUC), CBI), the actual number of 
parallel confederations is surely of no consequence. Perhaps the 
existence of one TUC and one CBI mean that the institutions of 
centralisation are in place and therefore this may indicate a degree of 
coordination potential but that surely should not be used as a measure 
of the role of existing bargaining institutions. One imagines that close 
inspection of the composition of the Calmfors and Driffil index (and 
other indices) would provide other examples of curious classification. 
If the UK was ranked alongside the US and Canada on the Calrnfors 
and Driffil index as a highly decentraIised economy, their non-linear 
relationship might well break down. 
Soskice ( 1990) argues that the Calmfors and Driffil index suffers 
from the problem of rnisclassification because it does not allow for the 
possibility of effective economy-wide coordination resulting from 
concerted action on the side of employers only - irrespective of union 
institutions and behaviour. He cites the examples of Switzerland and 
Japan to show that employer coordination over pay can produce 
similar beneficial outcomes to dual coordination environments. He 
then produces an alternative version of the Calmfors and Driffil index 
on this basis and finds a linear relationship with his chosen measures 
of economic performance. 
Two alternative and illuminating approaches are provided by 
Newell and Symons (1987) and Layard ( 1990) respectively. The 
novelty in the approach of Newell and Symons is to use the Bruno and 
Sachs' index but to also examine the influence of changes in the 
degree of corporatism in three countries (Germany, the UK and Japan) 
over time. Their approach is somewhat crude, delineating corporatist 
and non-corporatist periods but at least they allow for the possibility 
of changing environments. In contrast, Layard eschews the 
corporatism and centralisation indices in favour of testing the influence 
of some of their constituent parts on unemployment performance. He 
examines the separate importance of employer coordination, union 
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coordination and union coverage rather than combining them into an 
overall ranking. This is a particularly rewarding approach since in the 
studies which use the alternative indices of bargaining systems, it is 
not possible to determine which, if any, of the constituent parts of the 
indices is particularly influential. 
Only two of these studies, Freeman (1988) and Layard (1990), 
take account of the relative importance of collective bargaining as a 
whole within the respective countries examined. This is surely an 
important oversight. The US labour market is distinctive not 
particularly because bargaining is so decentralised but rather because 
it is predominantly non-union - collective bargaining covers only a 
small minority of employees. Even if pay setting in the small 
unionized sector was centralised, surely we would not categorize the 
US as a corporatist or centralised economy. Furthermore, changes in 
the industrial relations environment of the UK over the last 15-25 
years suggest enormous changes in the coverage of bargaining as well 
as movements towards extensive decentralisation. A highly unionized, 
highly decentralised economy will presumably be expected to perform 
differently from a low (or medium) unionized, highly decentralised 
economy. In short, the effect of different bargaining institutions must 
also depend to some extent on the relative levels of collective 
bargaining coverage. 
3.3 Measuring performance 
The fourteen studies summarised in Table 7 employ between 
them a large range of performance measures depending in part on their 
subjective assessments of what constitutes good performance. This 
debate is principally concerned with labour market performance - most 
studies concentrate on unemployment, employment and wage setting 
performance. Most popular, unsurprisingly, is an unemployment level 
measure, used by Bean, Layard and Nickell (1985), Calmfors and 
Driffil, Freeman, Layard, Soskice and Pohjola (1992). Three of these 
studies also examine changes in unemployment - Bean et ai., Calmfors 
and DriffIi, and Pohjola. Rowthorn (1992) however, criticizes the 
unemployment performance measure on the grounds that it does not 
take account of political, social and economic institutions which may 
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keep the unemployment rate down by artificial adjustment of the 
labour supply, particularly of women and foreign workers. He is 
particularly concerned to highlight Austria here, since it has enjoyed 
good unemployment performance largely as a result of adjusting 
labour supply. Therefore Rowthorn favours the employment rate as 
a more appropriate labour market performance measure. This measure 
is also employed by Calmfors and Driffil, Freeman, and Pohjola. 
Various authors point out that the results of the unemployment 
and employment rates may be misleading since these performance 
measures may be more influenced by economic policy decisions as by 
underlying bargaining institutions - i.e. by both the demand and the 
supply side. It may be more appropriate to examine the response of 
wage bargainers to changes in unemployment brought about by 
external or internal shocks. Real wage flexibility, or its obverse real 
wage rigidity, is conventionally measured as the decline (or change) 
in real wages resulting from a I percentage point rise in 
unemployment. This performance indicator is considered in four 
studies - Bean et ai., Newell and Symons, Pohjola, and Heylen (1992). 
What is particularly enlightening about this indicator is that it reveals 
how economies respond to adverse macroeconomic situations - how 
bargainers respond in bad times. 
Composite performance indicators have been used in various 
studies. Particularly prevalent is Okun's "misery index" - constructed 
as the sum of unemployment and inflation rates. This is another 
means of considering the economic policy/labour institutions mix. 
Alternative misery indices include: a measure combining the rate of 
inflation and the growth rate (Bruno and Sachs); the unemployment 
rate combined with the current account deficit as a percentage of GOP; 
and Rowthorn's INDEED index - the employment rate plus a wage 
equality measure (1 minus a wage dispersion score). 
3.4. Findings 
As stated in the introduction the studies divide up quite 
distinctively into the "linearites" and the "non-linearites" in their 
findings. Some argue that their results show that corporatism is 
superior to non-corporatism on a reasonably monotonic scale. The 
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sceptics argue that both highly centralised and highly decentralised 
economies perfonn to a similar level compared to the poor performing 
intennediate economies. 
a. There is a positive, linear relationship between the degree of 
corporatism or centralisation and performance 
In studies employing either rank correlation techniques or more 
sophisticated regression analysis. a positive, monotonic relationship is 
found between a number of the perfonnance variables and one of the 
bargaining institutions scales. These findings were confinned in all 
six different studies published before Calmfors and Driffil produced 
their sceptical view and in three of the other eight studies in Table 7. 
Layard and Soskice each fall into the linear camp even though they do 
not actually employ either of the corporatism indices in their studies. 
Actually both of their studies concentrate on the effect of employer 
coordination on perfonnance. and Layard in particular finds that this 
is the single most important institutional variable for explaining 
variation in unemployment perfonnance - holding all else equal -
across 20 OECD countries (1983-88). 
b. Both highly corporatist (centralised) and highly non-corporatist 
(decentralised) economies perform best 
Calmfors and Driffil's findings have been supplemented since 
1988 with four studies which examine other outcome variables and/or 
different time periods to those of the original authors. Most of these 
four reiterate the significant non-linear relationship between the 
Calmfors and Driffil index and unemployment rates and changes. 
employment rates and real wage flexibility. However. two of the four 
also test Tarantelli' s corporatism index alongside Calmfors and Driffil 
and duly find a linear relationship. 
Again the principal reason for these conflicting results is the 
index of bargaining institutions used. Calmfors and Driffil confinn 
this by running the tests in other studies (specifically Bean et al. and 
Newell and Symons) with their index. instead of Bruno and Sachs' 
and declare that the monotonic relationship no longer holds up. In 
addition Soskice changes the ranking of two high perfonners in the 
Calmfors and Driffil scale (Switzerland and Japan) from uncoordinated 
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to coordinated and finds a linear relationship between the revised scale 
and the mean unemployment rate for the late 1980s and one misery 
index. 
Therefore the crucial question is which of the competing indices 
of bargaining institutions has more merits? Calmfors and Driffil argue 
that their scale allows an examination of one aspect of corporatism -
the level of collective bargaining - and therefore does not cloud the 
issue with intermediary variables. The question of which index is 
most appropriate is surely uuresolvable since the indices are so 
subjective anyway. 
3.5. Implications 
The often unanswered question stemming from this group of 
empirical studies and theories is what are the policy implications -
particularly for the poor performers in the OECD? It seems rather 
facetious to state that the Layards and Soskices of this world advocate 
moves towards more corporatist or centralised structures of bargaining, 
whereas Calmfors and Driffil and others argue for either a Swedish 
style system or the polar extreme of the decentralised US. The 
disparity of views is particularly apparent for policy implications for 
quite decentralised economies like the UK and Italy. The implications 
of the Calmfors and Driffil study for the UK is that the most feasible 
means of improving performance is to move to a US style model 
rather than a centralised type system. 
There are two overriding and interrelated issues on this question 
of policy implications which deserve consideration. First concerns the 
endogeneity of corporatism. There must be something of a worry that 
the causation between bargaining environment and macro performance 
cuts both ways - consensus and the institutions of it are fostered by 
good performance. Perhaps it is only a well-functioning labour market 
and product market which can support a consensus based, centralised 
bargaining system since parties are dividing up growing spoils. 
Second, and far more important, is the question of whether or not 
it is actually possible for poor performers to fundamentally change 
their collective bargaining system, in particular from a non-corporatist 
to a corporatist system. Archer (1992) provides a critical analysis of 
the so-called tradition-bound thesis advocated by Crouch that policy 
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inakers cannot choose to be corporatist because the factors which 
determine whether an economy is corporatist or liberal (non­
corporatist) were at play in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
This thesis therefore holds that whether or not an economy is 
conducive to corporatism is a function not of contemporary choices 
but rather of long-established traditions and therefore decisions made 
many decades ago. Archer is critical of Crouch's view, using the 
example of Australia in the 1980s to argue that here is an example of 
a country without the corporatist tradition which established (fairly 
successfully) a consensus over economic policy. However given the 
recent (perhaps temporary) breakdown in national bargaining in 
Australia, perhaps Crouch is correct in the long term. Although 
corporatist experiments may succeed in the short term, countries are 
unable to permanently move from a non-corporatist to a corporatist 
system. If Crouch is correct, then the policy implications of all these 
studies may be minimal. 
4. What are the Lessons for Spain? 
4.1. Introduction 
In this section the key issue is what does the institutions and 
performance debate imply for Spain? The most obvious way to 
approach this is to consider whether or not the relative rankings of 
Spain on the scales detailed in Table 6 are consistent with the 
observed poor performance of the labour market Consistent may not 
necessarily mean causation but this will at least provide some 
indication of whether or not Spain's industrial relations institutions can 
help to explain poor performance. Table 6 reveals that where Spain 
has been included in three of the five scales (either in the original or 
updated versions) it has been categorized alongside other poor 
performers and is therefore consistent with both the linear and non­
linear theoretical relationships. However, there are some important 
caveats to this relatively straightforward conclusion. 
Another means of considering this key issue is to examine 
evidence on changes in institutions since 1975 alongside various 
performance indicators. This provides supplementary evidence to the 
cross-country comparisons and takes account of the major criticism of 
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the studies summarized in Table 7 - that they fail to consider the 
impact of institutional changes within national economies. Admittedly, 
there are also problems with interpretation of time series evidence such 
that it must be seen as a supplementary rather than a wholly 
alternative means of analysis. 
4.2. Spain's relative institutional ranking and performance 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) provide updated versions of 
the two main scales in Table 6 - Tarantelli' s neo-corporatism index 
and Calrnfors and Driffil's centralisation of bargaining index. On both 
scales Spain is assigned a ranking amongst the other three poor 
performing EC countries - France, the UK and Italy. In Tarantelli's 
index this puts Spain at the bottom of the scale, whereas Spain is 
placed around the middle on the Calmfors and Driffil's scale with 
other intermediate bargaining systems. Spain's worse than average 
labour market performance is therefore consistent both with the linear 
relationship suggested by Tarantelli and others, and the hump-shaped 
relationship suggested by Calmfors and Driffil in their analysis. 
The single example of Spain therefore reinforces the picture that 
the fundamental difference between the two views of institutions and 
performance rests on both what criteria are used for categorizing 
countries and where individual countries are placed on the resulting 
scales. Note that Layard's quasi-index of employer coordination also 
includes Spain CLayard, 1990). It is ranked among the least 
coordinated group which is again consistent both with Layard's 
predictions and findings. Therefore Spain can be cited as a country in 
need of more centralisation by one camp, and of either more 
decentralisation or centralisation by the other. Though there does 
appear to be more weight of evidence to suggest that, with high union 
coverage, centralised bargaining performs best. 
Caveats over this relatively straightforward conclusion arise when 
the building blocks of the two main scales are reconsidered alongside 
evidence on changes in the Spanish industrial relations system detailed 
in Section 2. To recap, Tarantelli's index is based on three 
dimensions: the neo-cooption of unions and employers' associations 
into government; the centralisation of bargaining; and the neo-
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regulation of conflict through dispute procedures. Whilst the exact 
scoring of Spain on these three dimensions could be debated at length, 
perhaps more important is the notion that, especially on the first two 
dimensions, we might score Spain now very differently from Spain 
five or ten years ago. Relationships between government, unions and 
employers' associations changed markedly (on the surface at least) in 
the mid-1980s with the cessation of explicit attempts to promote 
coordination and consensus in collective bargaining, and the distancing 
of the UGT from the PSOE government. On the second dimension, 
whilst the locus of collective bargaining has certainly moved away 
from the national stage (indicating a lower score) it has not reached 
the state of affairs as in the UK, with company level bargaining 
dominating after the decline in industry-wide bargaining. On both 
these dimensions therefore, not only would an exact score be 
problematic, but also a one-off ranking would obscure the impact of 
important changes in industrial relations institutions. 
Turning to Calmfors and Driffil's index, based on coordination 
within peak organisations and on the number of such parallel 
organisations on each side and the degree of coordination between 
them, similar problems of exact scoring and changes over time arise. 
Any attempt now to score Spain's institutions on these dimensions 
would have to take account of the end of national concertation 
agreements and produce a lower score and therefore ranking, than a 
similar attempt before 1986. 
Therefore in the case of both these scales, whilst it is possible to 
argue about the exact scoring of the Spanish system relative to others, 
the more important difficulty appears to be that the indices provide 
something of a straightjacket by not taking account of changes in 
bargaining structures. There may be good reasons for worrying about 
introducing the notion of countries moving up or down in the rankings 
since this makes analysis more difficult and would probably provide 
a new focus for disagreement about the rankings. Identifying the key 
changes which are sufficiently important to warrant a re-ranking will 
provoke more debate than establishing a once and for all ranking. 
However, the difficulty of a task should encourage rather than 
diminish interest in it. One starting point to such an analysis is to 
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consider changes in Spanish bargaining institutions alongside changes 
in performance over time. 
4.3. Time series evidence on institutions and performance 
a. Introduction 
In summarising the changes in Spanish industrial relations, 
Section 2 identified four dimensions on which to characterize the 
Spanish system: bargaining coverage; bargaining levels; the degree of 
coordination; and the role of the state. Whilst changes in the role of 
state and the degree of coordination are relatively difficult to quantify 
partly because of data inadequacies (coordination) and definitional 
difficulties (role of the state), identifying changes in the coverage and 
levels of bargaining is more straightforward. 
To recap, Figure 1 illustrates the enormous increase in collective 
bargaining coverage from just over 30% in 1977 to around 80% in 
1981 and subsequent stability of coverage for the following decade. 
Figure 1 also shows that after a slight rise in the proportion of 
employees covered by employer agreements up to a peak of around 
14% in 1985, there has been a fall to around 12% in 1991. So in 
terms of the single employer/multi employer division there appears to 
have been insufficient change to warrant more detailed analysis -
although there may have been more substantial changes in individual 
industries which could warrant more investigation. However, the key 
change in bargaining levels came about with the end of national level 
bargaining through the last concertation agreements in 1986. 
Therefore we have two identifiable phenomena to investigate - the 
massive rise in bargaining coverage in the late 1970s and the end of 
national bargaining after 1986. 
This means of analysis has two rather obvious pitfalls. First, 
telling a story about the pattern of performance alongside changes in 
institutions implicitly assumes that all else stays relatively constant 
There are a host of concurrent factors influencing each of the 
outcomes discussed such that any association with bargaining 
institutions change will not be clear cut. Second, it may also be that 
changes in performance lead to changes in institutions, rather than vice 
versa. Perhaps concertation agreements ended because of changes in 
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performance. It could be held, for example, that unions were 
responsible for the break-up of concertation in 1986. They had 
moderated their pay claims in the first half of the 1980s, then with 
macroeconomic expansion in the rnid-1980s the pay claims increased 
as labour leaders refused to be bound by the concertation agreements. 
Thus a changed macroeconomic performance altered the institutional 
arrangements in the labour market. Another possibility is that 
collective bargaining coverage may have expanded because 
unemployment was rising so fast, rather than vice versa. These 
caveats concerning (i) other variables influencing institutions and 
performance and (ii) the nature of the causal relationship, should be 
kept in mind when considering the following evidence. 
b. Changes in bargaining coverage and performance 
Figures 2 to 5 show data on bargaining coverage against five 
different performance measures respectively registered 
unemployment, real wage growth, the Okun index (inflation plus 
unemployment rates) and strike activity (measured in this case as days 
lost per thousand employees) for as many years as possible from 1977 
to 1992. Although interpretation of this data can never be that 
rigorous, and some associations may be spurious, some possible 
themes worth further investigation do emerge. 
Unemployment: There is a strong, positive correlation between 
the rise of collective bargaining and of unemployment in the decade 
up to 1987 (Figure 2). This suggests that the removal of direct 
government intervention in the terms and conditions set out in 
collective agreements - producing free collective bargaining - not only 
enabled and encouraged unions to extend the coverage of agreements 
(presumably in part because of employee preferences) but may also 
have provided an institutional framework augmenting insider-outsider 
problems. 
Real wages: However there is also evidence (Figure 3) that as 
collective bargaining became more encompassing, there was relatively 
more real wage responsiveness to the growth of unemployment. Real 
wage growth peaked in 1977-79 as unemployment first took off but 
then came down quite rapidly to average 2-3% for the rest of the 
period. Between 1977 and 1984 more workers came under the 
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umbrella of collective agreements. Simultaneously the concertation 
agreements caused real pay rises to moderate under collective 
bargaining. Thus, as bargaining became more encompassing, this had 
a direct influence on movements in real wages. 
Since 1986, despite the enormous rise in unemployment, real 
wages have continued to grow in virtually every year. It is possible 
that high levels of coverage are now insulating real pay: with less 
coverage (and no concertation) pay may be more flexible downwards. 
Okun index: The Okun or misery index (Figure 4) measures the 
combined performance of inflation and unemployment, therefore 
reflecting the view that an increase in unemployment (especially if 
short-term) may be acceptable if inflation falls as a result Whilst the 
rise in the index from 1978 to its peak of nearly 30% in 1983 occurred 
at a time of rising bargaining coverage, since 1983 the index has 
declined in virtually every year to reach a low of just over 20% in 
1991. Note that the rise in this series between 1978 and the early 
1980s is driven by the rise in unemployment - inflation is falling in 
just about every year in the period. 
10 the later period (post-1983) bargaining coverage remained 
consistently high. This suggests that whilst the growth of collective 
bargaining might be associated with an increasingly poor pay-jobs 
trade off, a high level of collective bargaining may not produce a 
progressively worsening position and in fact could well lead to 
improved performance. 
Strike activity: Figure 5 provides data on strike activity 
measured both as days lost per thousand employees and per thousand 
covered employees (following the example of Milner and Metcalf, 
1993). The second measure may be inappropriate, however, if a high 
proportion of days lost in the late-1970s arose from strikes in support 
of the extension of collective bargaining - and therefore involved a 
high percentage of non-covered workers. The data maps the 
considerable decline in strike activity in the 1980s compared to the 
late 1970s, but also shows that strike activity has remained relatively 
stable during the 1980s, unlike most other EC countries which have 
seen falls in activity (especially the UK). 10 terms of strike activity 
and bargaining coverage, the data shows a strong negative correlation 
between the rise in coverage and strike activity. However, stable and 
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high coverage has been associated with a stable and relatively high 
level of strike activity compared to other EC countries. 
c. Changes in the level of bargaining and performance 
Given the relative stability of bargaining coverage after 1980 and 
the emphasis in the literature reviewed in Section 3 on bargaining 
levels, the end of national concertation agreements in 1986 is 
obviously of crucial importance. Although there are considerable 
worries here because there are relatively few years of performance 
data since 1986, it does seem worthwhile to investigate performance 
before and after 1986. 
Unemployment: The end of national bargaining came at a 
turning point in the registered unemployment series in 1987. Between 
1987 and 1992 registered unemployment fell from about 20 to 15% 
(note though that self-reported unemployment as recorded in the 
Encuesta de Poblacion Activa did not fall as far as registered 
unemployment and increased substantially in 1992). However, since 
early 1992 unemployment has increased dramatically. It may well be 
fortuitous accident (for advocates of decentralisation) that 
unemployment started falling so soon after the end of national 
bargaining. There must be some suspicion that, on the other hand, 
falling unemployment removed the imperative to reinvigorate national 
bargaining. Indeed perhaps the recent rise in unemployment was the 
spur to the government's attempt to revive tri-partite negotiations in 
1993. 
Real wages: The data on real wage growth after 1986 provides 
some succour for advocates of decentralised bargaining, since not only 
has decentralisation not lead to an increase in real wage growth per se 
(as Layard might predict) but growth has remained quite stable despite 
falling unemployment There does not appear to have been a build up 
of real wage pressure during concertation which was released after 
1986. This may be because of union coordination in sector level 
bargaining arrangements which is producing an environment relatively 
similar to that operating under national agreements. It would be 
interesting to examine the experience of different sectors post-1986 to 
further investigate the impact of the end of national agreements on 
wage bargaining. 
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Okun index: Since the turning point in the Okun index series 
and its subsequent decline are largely governed by movement in the 
unemployment rate, any link between this outcome variable and the 
end of national bargaining must be attributable to any association with 
unemployment 
Strike activity: There does not appear to be a strong link 
between the end of national bargaining and either an increase or 
decrease in strike activity as measured by the days lost indices. 
4.4. Conclusions 
Even in the absence of reliable information about how industrial 
relations function at enterprise or workplace level, policy makers still 
have to make decisions about reforms to the system if economic 
performance is to be improved. It can not be stressed too strongly, 
however, that these conclusions are based on wholly inadequate data 
and are therefore purely speculative. 
Legislative support for the institutions of collective bargaining 
are the principal explanation for high bargaining coverage in Spain. 
When bargaining coverage is high, it seems more sensible to advocate 
some form of centralised or at least coordinated system of collective 
bargaining in order to improve the pay-jobs trade off. Decentralised 
bargaining only appears to work in economies with low union 
presence. The political implications of removing state support for 
collective bargaining in Spain are probably too grave to warrant its 
consideration. Therefore as long as Spanish policy makers are 
prepared to support a unionized labour market, the most sensible 
option is to develop a more coordinated bargaining structure. 
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PART II 
MICROECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: THE INDUSTRIAL PAY 
STRUCTURE AND EMPLOYMENT 
1. Introduction 
The key issue concerning flexibility in the industrial wage 
structure is whether or not the nexus of productivity change/wage 
change/employment change across industries has a favourable or 
unfavourable impact on jobs. 
The importance of flexibility in relative wages in allocating 
labour across sectors (possibly also affecting aggregate employment) 
is not a new topic. Over a quarter of a century ago, Reddaway (1959) 
compared and contrasted the "institutional" approach with the 
"competitive" model of allocation in the labour market In the 
institutional approach, "the essential characteristic is that the main way 
in which employment will either be increased or reduced is through 
'direct action' by the employers, and that only exceptionally will they 
have to include a change in the relative wage offered in order to 
secure the desired number of workers". By contrast, the competitive 
approach puts wage flexibility to the fore and suggests that, in the 
short-run, sectors expanding (contracting) employment will raise 
(lower) their relative wages. An OECD Working Party examined this 
controversy and reported in 1965 that they "inclined to the view that 
the allocation of labour had been sensitive primarily to job vacancies 
and not to movements in relative wages" (quoted in OECD 1985a, 
p. l06). It found sector-specific excess demand influenced sector real 
wage movements in only 2 out of 13 sectors and concludes that "This 
result casts considerable doubt on the role of relative wages in 
allocating labour between sectors of the economy, since it suggests 
that relative wages are not very responsive to sectoral shifts in labour 
requirements. " 
These different views of the labour allocation process were set 
out in a novel way by Bell and Freeman (1984). Their approach is 
particularly helpful in the present context because it concentrates on 
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whether or not the wage setting and labour allocation process across 
sectors aids aggregate employment. 
They distinguish two types of flexibility. Under competitive 
flexibility, industry wages are responsive to shifts in demand for, and 
supply of, workers in particular industries and employment will be 
greater than if wages are inflexible. Under industry-productivity wage 
flexibility, the flexibility is due to industry-specific conditions, 
independent of shifts in demand or supply of labour and need not have 
beneficial employment effects. In particular, consider a labour market 
where wages respond flexibly to industry specific changes in value 
productivity per worker which do not reflect shifts in demand. The 
downward pay flexibility in response to declines in productivity per 
worker can certainly "save" jobs, but the upward flexibility of wages 
in response to increases in value productivity will, in the same sense, 
"cost" jobs - those industries experiencing a rapid growth of 
productivity will hire too few workers. In this system, if wages fall 
less with relative productivity declines than wages rise with relative 
productivity increases, the system of flexible wages will, net, result in 
less employment than would otherwise have been observed. 
Therefore in principle there are two situations where wage 
flexibility among industries has positive employment consequences. 
First, when wages reflect competitive forces. Second, when wages are 
more flexible downwards than upwards to industry-specific 
productivity developments. We consider those in tum in Sections 2 
and 3 respectively. In Section 2 we note that the tradition of this 
micro-research is based on a causal mechanism that runs from 
employment changes to pay changes. It is suggested that the causal 
mechanism may, in fact, go the other way. 
Then in Section 4 we examine the way the industrial wage 
structure became more compressed during the 1980s. We then link 
the compression with relative employment movements across 
industries. 
In Section 5, we present the pay-jobs, pay-productivity and 
compression results of Sections 2-4 respectively in a more 
disaggregated form. This Section uses collective bargaining coverage 
as a control variable. 
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Finally, we analyse the change in the bite of Spanish minimwn 
wage laws (Section 6). The toughness of these laws has declined over 
time. The association between changes in minimum wages and 
employment is examined. 
2. Pay Changes and Employment Changes 
The evidence concerning pay changes and employment 
movements across 20 2-digit industries is set out in Table 8. The 
competitive approach states explicitly that, because the labour supply 
curve facing the firm is more elastic in the long run than in the short 
run, a positive correlation across industries between pay changes and 
employment changes should be stronger the shorter the time period. 
There is virtually no evidence of such competitive flexibility. Under 
competitive flexibility we expect a positive correlation between 
employment changes and pay changes in the short run (say over a one 
year period), but that association would become weaker as the period 
gets longer. For example, the correlation would probably be positive 
but non-significant over a five year period and zero over a longer 
period. 
The correlations are presented for I -year, 4-year and 8-year 
changes. It will be seen that more of the correlations using I-year 
changes in pay and employment are negative than are positive, and 
none of the correlations are statistically significant. Further, the 
correlations using the 4-year data (1984-88) and 8-year data (1980-88) 
are strongly negative and strongly significant. 
The preponderance of negative signs suggests that there may be 
an identification problem. It is possible that the labour supply curve 
to particular industries is shifting (rightwards) more rapidly than the 
labour demand curve. Such a shift could occur, for example, if the 
labour force participation of women rises rapidly. However, we 
normally think of labour supply in terms of occupational definitions 
rather than as being specific to any one industry. 
This lack of any strong evidence of positive short-run (I-year) 
or medium-run (4-year) correlations in Spain is consistent with 
evidence from other OECD countries. The most comprehensive 
evidence is from the OECD (l 985a, Chapter 4; I985b, Chapter 2). 
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These documents survey important previous studies and present new 
information for OECD countries. Similar to Spain. over half the many 
I-year correlations presented are negative ( l985a, p. 127). The OECD 
report concludes. reasonably. that the results "suggest the possibility 
that the importance of relative wages is outweighed or supplemented 
by many other factors as an allocation mechanism" ( l985a. p.128 and 
p.129). 
The tradition of research on the industrial wage structure has the 
causation running from changes in labour demand (employment) to 
changes in wages. There is an alternative causal mechanism which 
might account for the Spanish results. If positive employment changes 
are larger where positive pay changes are lower - the causation 
running from pay to jobs - a negative correlation like that in Table 1 
would be found. 
It is particularly noteworthy that the negative association between 
pay increases and employment changes was stronger in the second 4-
year period ( 1984-88) than the first 4-year period ( 1980-84). In the 
latter part of the 1980s the Spanish labour market was more flexible 
than in the first half. For example. the importance of national 
collective bargaining declined. EC entry put pressure on traditional 
labour practices. female labour force participation rose and fIxed-term 
labour contracts were permitted. These are certainly just the factors 
which might promote a causation (at sector level) running from 
moderate pay changes to greater employment. 
3. Pay Changes and Labour Productivity Changes 
Standard theory suggests no long-run association between pay 
changes and labour productivity changes across fIrms and industries. 
Any such correlation. if sustained over a long period. would be both 
ineffIcient and inequitable. 
However. recent developments in the insider-outsider approach 
to pay-setting emphasise the link - at least in the short-run - between 
the fortunes of the fIrm and sector. and pay changes. If there is a 
positive association at industry level between pay changes and labour 
productivity changes it could still be employment-augmenting. The 
reasoning is as follows (Bell and Freeman. 1 984; OECD. 1 985b). On 
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the one hand, if relative pay falls in response to a fall in relative 
productivity, employment will be higher in these sectors than it would 
have been with no response in relative pay, i.e. some jobs are "saved". 
On the other hand, where relative pay rises in response to a rise in 
relative productivity, employment will be lower in these sectors than 
it would have been with no response in relative pay, i.e. some jobs are 
"lost". If (a) the relative productivity-increasing and relative 
productivity-decreasing sectors are of equal size; (b) they have equal 
elasticities of labour demand; and (c) they have identical (but different 
signed) relative productivity movements, then employment will be 
higher than it otherwise would have been providing there is a 
favourable asymmetry in the wage response. If relative pay falls more 
in sectors where relative productivity is falling than relative pay rises 
in sectors where relative productivity is rising, employment will be 
higher than it would be without this asymmetry. 
The correlations between pay movements and labour productivity 
movements are set out in Table 9. Looking initially at the column 
reporting the correlation across all 15 2-digit manufacturing industries 
("overall correlation"), we see that both 4-year correlations and the 8-
year correlation are non-significant. Thus the evidence suggests that 
the industrial pay structure in Spain moves in accord with standard 
theory, i.e. pay movements appear to be unrelated to movements in 
labour productivity. 
We report, out of interest, the corresponding correlations splitting 
the sample into industries with above average and below average 
changes in labour productivity. Strictly this split is only of interest 
where the correlation across the whole sample is significant and 
positive. The only instance approaching this is 1984-1988 (r = 0. 1 1 3). 
In this instance, the pay movements are not employment-augmenting. 
This is because the correlation is much stronger in the industries with 
above average productivity increases (r = 0.808) than in those with 
below average productivity increases (r = 0.153). 
This latter result is congruent with related analyses of Dolado 
and Bentolila (1992) and Draper (1992, reported in Dolado and 
Bentolila). Oolado and Bentolila calculate "insider weights" - which 
essentially measure the importance of the fortunes of the firm/sector 
rather than the aggregate economy in pay determination - for different 
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sectors. They find that insider weights are larger in fast growing 
sectors than in slow growing sectors. This could have two potentially 
adverse effects. First, it could import an inflationary bias into the 
wage-setting process along the lines of the familiar Scandinavian 
model. Second, it could hinder aggregate employment growth via 
similar routes to those set out by Bell and Freeman. 
Draper supports this general thrust. She classifies sectors into 
two types. Laggard sectors, like construction and food manufacturing, 
are sheltered from foreign competition, and pay responds little to 
changes in labour productivity inside the firm. By contrast, dynamic 
sectors like chemicals and autos are open to foreign competition, use 
state-of-the-art technology and pay responds to internal conditions. 
This is in line with the "Scandinavian model" where insider weights 
vary across sectors and the variation is explained, partially, by the 
degree of openness and competition across sectors. 
Spain appears to accord with standard theory rather more closely 
than some other OECD countries. There is no significant correlation 
in Spain between pay movements and changes in value added per 
worker. Nevertheless, it may be of interest to present the results for 
other OECD countries so that Spain can be put in context. The OECD 
study ( l985b, Chapter 2) uses regression analysis with a highly 
disaggregated sample of 3-digit and 4-digit industries in Canada, 
France, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA to explain (cross-section) 
industry pay changes. Such pay changes derive from changes in 
sector specific value added, changes in shipments and changes in the 
skill composition. Movements in value added per worker are 
positively associated with pay movements in each of the six countries 
(but the association is not statistically significant in France or the UK). 
Evaluated on the basis of sample means, the elasticity of sectoral wage 
changes to sectoral productivity changes is as follows: 
Canada 
Japan 
Sweden 
USA 
0.116 
0.208 
0.026 
0.261 
(manufacturing, 1970-80) 
(manufacturing, 1970-79) 
(all industries, 1964-83) 
(all industries, 1958-80) 
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Thus employees do appear to get a share of industry-specific 
productivity changes. While this result holds across countries with 
very different systems of collective bargaining, the association is 
stronger in the USA and Japan where bargaining is decentralised than 
it is in Sweden where bargaining is more centralised. 
This association between pay changes and productivity changes 
across industries is employment-augmenting in Canada, Sweden and 
the USA, but it has adverse affects on employment in Japan, while it 
has no effect in France and the UK. This is because in Canada, 
Sweden and the USA, more jobs are "saved" in sectors where 
productivity is falling than are "lost" in sectors where it is rising. The 
reverse is true for Japan. 
4. Compression of the Industrial Wage Structure and 
Employment 
There is evidence for both the USA (Wachter, 1974) and the UK 
(Metcalf, 1977) that the industrial wage structure gets compressed 
during incomes policy periods and unwinds again once the policy is 
relaxed. The rationale for such a finding might be that incomes 
policies inhibit the activities of strong groups in the workforce 
(typically towards the top of the pay structure) while protecting weaker 
groups. Alternatively the incomes policy might operate on an equal 
cash rather than an equal percentage formula for pay rises, which 
automatically compresses the wage structure. 
In Table 10 some similar corresponding information is presented 
for Spain. (Unfortunately we cannot control other factors which have 
been shown to influence movements in the wage structure in the USA 
and UK - e.g. inflation and unemployment - because the time series 
is not long enough to permit regression analysis.) 
Consider initially the last column. Over the whole period 1980-
88 the Spanish hourly wage structure became substantially more 
egalitarian: the sectors which started with relatively high levels of 
hourly pay experienced lower increases than sectors with low pay 
levels. Thus the pay structure was compressed. It is interesting (and 
by contrast to the UK and US experience) that the compression was 
smaller in the first half of the 1980s - when an incomes policy was in 
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operation - than it was in the second half when the incomes policy 
was initially relaxed and finally abandoned. 
More important is the apparent link between the movements in 
pay and in employment shown in the first column of Table 10. The 
sectors toward the top of the industrial wage distribution in 1980 -
which, if one recalls, had the most moderate pay rises during 1980-88 
- experienced a much stronger growth in employment during 1980-88 
than those industries towards the bottom of the wage structure where 
pay rose more rapidly. The correlation is 0.438, statistically 
significant at 5%. In a nutshell, the compression of the wage structure 
appeared good for jobs, at least in its impact across industries (it is 
clearly impossible to test for the aggregate macroeconomic impact of 
the compression of the pay structure from this micro data). 
These findings concerning the link between the structure of 
relative pay and employment are consistent with the evidence in 
Jimeno and Toharia (1992) who conclude that "this factor [Le. the 
structure of relative wages 1 goes further towards explaining aggregate 
employment reductions than the evolution of the average wage level," 
(p.87). The results are also in line with those in Section 2 which 
noted the negative association between changes in pay and changes in 
employment. 
5. Controlling for Coverage of Collective Bargaining 
It might be expected that industries where collective bargaining 
coverage is relatively low would exhibit more flexibility of pay and 
employment than those industries where coverage is high. Tables 11-
13 provide some very preliminary evidence on this issue. They 
replicate Tables 8-10 respectively, but present the information 
separately for those sectors with high and low coverage of collective 
bargaining. 
It will be seen from Table 11 that there is only one significant 
positive association between employment changes and pay changes, 
either in sectors with high collective bargaining coverage or those with 
low coverage. This confirms that the "traditional" competitive 
allocation of the labour process whereby expanding (contracting) 
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industries raise (lower) their relative pay was not present in Spain in 
the 1980s. 
What is particularly noticeable is that all the 4-year and 8-year 
correlations are negative. Two of those are highly significant for 
sectors with high coverage of collective bargaining. This tends to 
confinn the speculation in Section 2 concerning the direction of 
causation - possibly from pay to jobs rather than vice versa. 
The data on pay changes and labour productivity changes in 
Table 12 provides no evidence that movements in sectoral relative 
wages detract from employment on this count. First, for sectors with 
deeper collective bargaining, none of the coefficients are significant. 
Second, for sectors with lower coverage of collective bargaining, the 
1984-88 and 1980-88 correlations are significant and negative: high 
productivity growth sectors falling in the relative wage league table. 
Thus, if there is an insider-outsider problem (see Section 3), it is 
probably confined to sectors with above average coverage of collective 
bargaining. Certainly, there is no evidence in the low collective 
bargaining sectors that insiders in industries with rapidly growing 
labour productivity are taking the lion's share of the returns to the 
detriment of employment. 
The relationship between movements in pay and jobs is set out 
more forcefully in Table 13. The bottom panel of this Table confinns 
that the compression of the pay structure took place in both high- and 
low-coverage of collective bargaining industries: all the correlation 
coefficients are negative. The strongest compression in relative pay 
was experienced by the sectors where collective bargaining is more 
pervasive. 
The top panel of the Table then shows how the compression of 
the pay structure influenced the structure of employment. For the 
high-coverage sectors which, if one recalls, experienced the largest 
compression of the industrial wage structure, there is a positive 
association between initial pay level and subsequent employment 
growth. This precisely mirrors the aggregate results (discussed in 
Section 4). The sequence is (all in relative terms): high wage level -
lower subsequent wage growth - larger subsequent employment 
growth. 
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By contrast, two of the correlations for the low-coverage sectors 
are negative (and significant). The sequence here appears to be: high 
initial wage level - lower subsequent wage growth (but only by a little 
bit, the coefficients are negative but non-significant) - lower 
subsequent employment growth (over 1980-88 and 1984-88). 
The upshot of this analysis is to confirm the importance of 
splitting by sector. It is the sectors where collective bargaining 
coverage is highest which dominate the all-industry results. In 
addition, the compression of the wage structure in those sectors was 
the crucial element in all-industry findings of high relative pay levels -
larger subsequent relative growth in jobs. 
6. Minimum Wages and Employment 
The link between various forms of minimum pay-setting and the 
aggregate level and structure of jobs has long been controversial and 
of interest The most recent research for the UK and US casts doubt 
on the traditional claims that minimum wage legislation costs jobs. 
Manning and colleagues (e.g. Dickens et al., 1993, Machin and 
Manning, 1992) present a modern monopsony model and conclude 
that, if anything, minimum wages boost rather than lower aggregate 
employment. For the US a recent (1992) issue of the Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review contained four articles on minimum wages: 
three found no link with employment and one found a very weak 
(adverse) association. 
This is a potentially fruitful area of research for Spanish scholars. 
In what follows we are hardly able to scratch the surface of the link 
between minimum pay setting and jobs in Spain. These very 
provisional findings hint that the recent research results for the UK 
and US may also be similar in Spain. 
Minimum wages in Spain are national (as in the US) and do not 
differ by industry (as in the UK). The bite of the national minimum 
wage for each of the 20 industries is set out in Figure 6. It will be 
seen that the bite or toughness - defined as the minimum relative to 
the average - has declined in virtually every industry. These charts are 
summarised in Table 14. This shows that the bite, averaged across 20 
industries, declined from 32.2 to 25.6%. The industry where the 
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minimum bites most is number 45, footwear and clothing (41.1 %) and 
the lowest bite is number 81, banking (8.8%). 
In Table 15 some simple correlations between changes in the bite 
of minimum wages and changes in employment are presented. The 
left hand panel uses the daily minimum and the right hand panel uses 
monthly minimum information. 
If a hike in the bite of the minimum wage detracts from 
employment in an industry, the correlation across industries between 
employment changes and bite changes would be negative and 
significant. It will be seen that no such coefficients are present. 
Rather, the bulk of the correlations are positive. Indeed, for the period 
1980-88, the correlation is as high as +0.516 (significant at 1 %) using 
hourly data. 
It must be understood that the results in Table 15 are essentially 
the mirror-image of those in Table 8. This is because the (change in 
the) minimum wage is identical for all industries. Therefore we are 
essentially dealing with a simple correlation between changes in 
employment and changes in pay across 20 2-digit industries (the sign 
changes, for each correlation, between the two Tables because average 
pay changes become the denominator in Table 15). 
It is possible that the Spanish minimum wage contributes to high 
macroeconomic levels of unemployment by causing the whole pay 
structure to be too high relative to labour productivity. We cannot 
investigate that possibility here. But, frankly, it seems most unlikely. 
The sector level information provides no support for the view that 
minimum wages are costing jobs. If anything, the data suggests the 
reverse causation: growing levels of unemployment in Spain may 
have encouraged a weakening of the minimum wage levels so that 
their bite has become less strong over time. 
- 57 -

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Part I on Spanish institutions and macroeconomic perfonnance it 
was shown: 
Section 2. 
Coverage of collective bargaining is high relative to the low and 
probably declining level of union density. 
The centre of gravity of the level of collective bargaining is 
firmly at sector level; however, despite the lack of good 
infonnation there is a suggestion of considerable infonnal 
bargaining at company level. 
There is some coordination in bargaining at sector level between 
the two main unions but coordination among employers is weak. 
Industrial relations are highly regulated by the state. Although 
employers and unions have considerable freedom to operate, they 
have no freedom to choose whether or not to bargain with each 
other in the first place. 
Section 3. 
Using evidence from OECD countries, there is disagreement 
concerning which system of industrial relations yields the best 
macroeconomic outcomes. Some argue for a more corporatist/ 
centralist/coordinated system of collective bargaining. Others 
argue for either a very centralised system or a completely 
decentralised system. 
However, in this debate it is never clear whether: (i) the causal 
relationship really runs from institutions to perfonnance; (ii) bad 
perfonners can change their bargaining institutions in the long 
run. 
Section 4. 
In the period when coverage of collective bargaining has risen to 
comparatively high levels: (i) the non-accelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment has risen; (ii) while strikes remain high 
compared with other EC countries, strike activity has fallen over 
time. 
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If the state supports unionisation and collective bargaining, it is 
probably best to pursue some fonn of co-ordinated bargaining 
(which does not necessarily imply centralisation or corporatist 
arrangements) so that bargaining externalities can be internalised. 
Part II focussed on links between flexibility in the industrial wage 
structure and relative employment by sector. It was shown: 
Section 2. 
As for most other OECD countries, there is no strong evidence 
that competitive forces dominate any observed flexibility in 
relative wages. The short-run correlation coefficients between 
pay changes and employment changes are negative. This 
suggests that any causation at sector level runs from lower pay 
increases to higher relative employment increases. 
Section 3. 
There is no association, at sector level, between pay changes and 
changes in labour productivity. 
Section 4. 
Industries with relatively high wage levels at the start of the 
period experienced relatively low pay increases during 1980-88 
and had the largest relative growth in employment. Thus - at 
least at sector level - the compression of the pay structure 
appears employment-augmenting. 
Section 5. 
When the sample is split according to whether or not the 
industry has below-average or above-average coverage of 
collective bargaining the above results concerning the pay­
productivity-employment nexus are broadly confumed. It is 
particularly noteworthy that the result concerning Section 4 is 
driven by pay and employment movements in the more highly 
covered sectors. 
Section 6. 
The bite of Spanish minimum wage laws has weakened over 
time. There is no evidence that these minimum wages cost jobs. 
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TABLE 1 
Coverage of Collective Agreements 
Year No. of Number of Number of % of 
Agreements Employers Employees Employees 
Covered Covered Covered 
(OOOs) (OOOs) 
1977 1 349 557.1 2876.4 32.5 
1978 1 838 637.1 4629.2 53.7 
1979 2122 657.8 4959.6 59.1 
19801 2564 877.7 6069.6 76.3 
19812 2694 672.7 4468.5 56.8 
19822 3385 889.3 6262.3 81 .2 
1983 3655 869.7 6226.3 8 1 . 1  
1984 3796 836.9 6181 .9 84.7 
1985 3834 847. 1 6131.1  84.8 
1986 3790 891.8 6275.1 82.0 
1987 4112 996.8 6867.7 86. 1 
1988 4096 958.3 6864.7 82.2 
1989 4302 982.7 6993.8 78.8 
1990 4595 1037.9 7623.9 82.2 
1 99 1  4781 1001.3 7791.9 83.1 
Notes: 1 .  Data for the Basque Country and Catalonia not included. 
2. Data for Catalonia not included. 
Source: Boletfn de Estadfsticas Laborales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad 
Social, Table CON-I. 
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Year 
1981 1 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Note: 
Source: 
TABLE 2 
Levels of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements Workers Affected 
Number No. of % Finn Number No. by % by 
Finn Level Finn Finn 
Level Level Level 
2694 1778 66.00 4435.2 928.9 20.94 
3385 2186 64.58 6262.9 985.7 15.74 
3655 2376 65.01 6226.3 1074.6 17.26 
3796 2539 66.89 6181.9 1060.5 17.15 
3834 2590 67.55 6131.1  1062.5 17.33 
3790 2588 68.28 6275. 1  1092.8 17.41 
41 12 2817 68.51 6867.7 1 106.5 16. 1 1  
4096 2826 68.99 6864.7 1070.4 15.59 
4302 3016 70.1 1  6993.8 1061.9 15.18 
4595 3254 70.82 7623.9 1 132.6 14.86 
4781 3423 7 1.60 7791.9 1 1 17.2 14.34 
I. Data for Catalonia not included. 
Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad 
Social, Table CON-I. 
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TABLE 3 
Economy-Wide Framework Agreements 1977-1986 
Date Name of Parties Involved Wage Increase 
Agreement Recommended 
1977 Moncloa Political Parties Maximum 20% 
Pacts 
1979 ABI CEOE/UGT 20-22% 
1980 AMI CEOE/UGT/USO 13-16% 
1981 AMI CEOE/UGT/USO 1 1-15% 
1982 ANE Govt/CEOE/CCOO/UGT 9-1 1% 
1983 AI CEOE/UGT/CCOO 9.5-12.5% 
1984 No 
agreement 
1985 AES Govt/CEOE/UGT 5.5-7.5% 
1986 AES CEOE/UGT 7.2-8.6% 
Notes: ABr: Basic futerconfederal Agreement. 
futerconfederal Framework Agreement. 
National Agreement on Employment. 
futerconfederal Agreement. 
AMI: 
ANE: 
AI: 
AES: 
CEOE: 
UGT: 
CCOO: 
USO: 
Sources: 
Economic and Social Agreement. 
Confederaci6n de Organizaciones Empresariales de Espana 
(employers' organisation · comprehensive coverage). 
Uni6n General de Trabajadores (general union - socialist). 
Comisiones Obreras (literally 'workers councils' -
communist). 
Uni6n Sindical Obrera (general union - Christian Democrat). 
Lucio (1992: Table 15.3), Miguelez and Prieto (1991:  Cuadro 
I, p.386) 
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TABLE 4 
Perfonnance in Worker Representatives Elections 1978-87 
(% of votes cast) 
Excluding Public Administration 
Union 1978 1980 1982 1986 1990 
CCOO 34.5 30.9 33.4 34.5 37.6 
UGT 21.7 29.3 36.7 40.9 43.1 
usa 3.9 8.7 4.6 3.8 3.0 
Non-
Members 1 8.2 14.6 12.1 6.7 3.9 
ELA-STV 
0.9 2.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 
lNTG - 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.5 
Misc. 20.8 13.1 8.7 10.1 6.4 
CSIF - - - - 1 .4 
Notes: CCOO, UGT, and usa see notes to Table 3. 
Public Administration 
Only 
1987 1990 
24.2 28.4 
23.1 26.9 
- 0.9 
- 2.4 
- 2.0 
- 1.8 
27.8 18.2 
24.9 19.4 
ELA-S1V: Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (union of Basque workers). 
lNTG: Intersindicai Gallega (union of Galician workers). 
CSIF: Public administration union. 
Sources: Lucio (1992: Table 15.2, p.501) and Miguelez and Prieto (1991: Cuadro I ,  
p.229), Escobar (1993: Table 5, p.25). 
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TABLE 5 
Multiple Unionism at the Bargaining Table 
Union Status of Representatives 
CCOO UGT Other Non- Total 
Unions Union 
No. of Agreements 
· Firm level 1568 1706 786 1227 3137 
· Other levels 1008 1086 388 62 1297 
· Total 2576 2792 1 174 1289 4434 
Workers Affected 
(OOOs) 
· Firm level 894 903 657 216 1 034 
· Other levels 5546 5676 1680 195 5968 
· Total 6440 6578 2337 411  7051 
No. of Representatives 
· Firm level 5798 5760 2815 3514 17887 
· Other levels 3293 3644 1228 251 8416 
· Total 9091 9404 4043 3765 26303 
Notes: Agreements covered are those registered up to May 1991. 
Degree of multi·unionism indicated by different union statuses 
summing to more than total. 
Source: Jimeno and Toharia (1991: Table I, p.2?) 
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TABLE 6 
Ranking of OECD Countries' Collective Bargaining Institutions 
Bruno 
and Sachs 
1 Austria 
2 Germany 
3 Netherlands 
4 Norway 
4 Sweden 
6 Switzerland 
7 Denmark 
8 Finland 
9 Belgium 
10 Japan 
II  New Zealand 
1 2  UK 
1 3  France 
14 Italy 
15 Australia 
16 Canada 
17 US 
Tarantelli 
1 Austria 
2 Gennany 
3 Japan 
4 Sweden 
4 Denmark 
6 Norway 
7 Australia 
7 Netherlands 
9 Finland 
10 US 
1 1  Belgium 
12 Canada 
13 New Zealand 
14 France 
15 UK 
16 Italy 
16 Spain 
CalmfOTS 
and Driflil 
1 Austria 
2 Norway 
3 Sweden 
4 Denmark. 
5 Finland 
6 Germany 
7 Netherlands 
8 Belgium 
9 New Zealand 
10 Australia 
1 1  France 
1 1  Spain 
13 UK 
14 Italy 
15 Japan 
16 Swit=land 
17 US 
18 Canada 
Layard Soskiee 
1 Austria I Japan 
I Finland 1 Austria 
1 Norway 3 Switzerland 
1 Sweden 3 Norway 
1 Switzerland 3 Sweden 
1 Denmark 6 Germany 
1 Germany 7 Netherlands 
8 Belgium 8 Italy 
8 France 9 France 
8 Netherlands 10 UK 
8 Ponugal 1 1  US 
8 Japan 
13 Ireland 
13 Italy 
13 Spain 
13 UK 
13 Australia 
13 New Zealand 
13 Canada 
13 US 
Notes: 1.  In original versions of Tarantelli's and Calmfors and Driffil's indices, Spain 
is not included. Revised versions of these indices including Spain are 
provided in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991: Table 7, p.418) and are 
reported here. 
2. Construction of rankings shown overleaf. 
- 66 -
Construction of Collective Bargaining Institutions Rankings 
Bruno and Sachs: Corporatism ranking 
Adapted from Crouch's (1985) assessment of corporatism indicators 
based on four dimensions: 
1 .  Union movement centralisation 
2. Shop-floor autonomy 
3. Employer coordination 
4. Existence of works councils 
Countries are scored 0, I or ? on each indicator. The sum of these 
provides a corporatism index ranging from ° to 4, from which the 
Bruno and Sachs ranking is produced. 
TarantelIi: Neocorporatism ranking 
Based on three dimensions: 
1. The degree of neocooption of trade unions and 
employers' representatives. This measures both the 
extent of political and economic consensus and the 
extent of integration and cooperation of trade unions 
and employers' representatives into the machinery of 
government. 
2. The degree of centralisation of collective bargaining. 
Incorporates factors such as: level of collective 
bargaining; centralisation of unions and employers' 
associations; existence of trilateral negotiations. 
3. The degree of neoregulation of industrial conflict. 
Attempt to measure how much the rank and file are 
'tamed' by institutions. Assessed by the extent of 
dispute procedure provision. 
Countries are scored from I to 5 on each dimension and the total score 
produces a neocorporatism index and therefore a ranking. 
Calmfors and Driffil: Centralisation of wage bargaining ranking 
Constructed with reference to two factors: 
1 .  Coordination level within central organisations. 
Combines information on level of coordination within 
national union confederations and within national 
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employer organisations - essentially a level of 
collective bargaining measure. 
2. Existence of parallel central organisations and their 
cooperation. Reflects the number of central union and 
employer confederations and the degree of 
cooperations between them. 
Both dimensions are scored between I and 3 to produce an overall 
score from 2 to 6 which is translated into the ranking in Table 6. 
Layard: Employer coordination score 
Simply a measure of the extent of employer coordination over pay 
bargaining, scored I ,  2 or 3. N.B. Layard uses this score in 
multivariate analysis rather than any rank numbers. Ranking in Table 
6 is that implied by scores. 
Soskice: Economy wide coordination score 
Measure of extent of coordination in bargaining which emphasises 
employer coordination in particular although does take account of 
union coordination. Countries are scored from 0 to 5. Uses score in 
statistical analysis. Ranking in Table 6 is that implied by scores. 
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TABLE S 
Correlations Coefficients on Hourly Pay and Employment 
Using Data for 20 2-digit Industries 
Association between Employment Changes and Pay Changes 
Period 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1980-1984 
1984-1988 
1980-1988 
Significance Levels 
* 10% 
**5% 
***1% 
Overall Correlation 
0.0882 
-0.1645 
-0.0413 
-0.0 1 1 2  
0.2059 
-0.2339 
-0. 1 1 28 
-0.3359 
-0.2963 
-0.4789*** 
-0.4775*** 
- 74 -
TABLE 9 
Correlations Coefficients on Hourly Pay and Productivity 
Using Data for 1 5  2-digit Manufacturing Industries 
Association between Pay Changes and Labour Productivity Changes 
Period Overall 
Correlation 
1980-
1984 -0.1360 
1984-
1988 0. 1 125 
1980-
1 988 -0.1876 
Significance Levels 
*10% 
**5% 
***1% 
Correlation in Correlation in 
Industries with those Industries 
Below Average with Above 
Changes in Average Changes 
Productivity . in Productivity 
0.2692 0.0510 
-0.1528 0.8082*** 
-0.0274 -0.8761 *** 
- 75 -
TABLE 10 
Correlation Coefficients of Original Level of Hourly Pay on 
Changes in Employment and Pay for 20 2-digit Industries 
Years 
1980-1984 
1984-1988 
1980-1988 
Significance levels 
* 10% 
** 5% 
*** 1% 
Employment Hourly Pay 
Changes and Changes and 
Original Hourly Original Level 
Pay Level 
0.4002* -0.2292 
0.1508 -0.7712*** 
0.4379** -0.7710*** 
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TABLE 11 
Correlations Coefficients on Hourly Pay and Employment 
Using Data for 20 2-digit Industries -
disaggregated by high and low collective bargaining coverage 
Association Between Employment Changes and Pay Changes 
Correlation Coefficients 
Period Overall 
Correlation 
1981 0.0882 
1982 -0.1642 
1983 -0.0413 
1984 -0.0112 
1985 0.2059 
1986 -0.2339 
1987 0. 1 128 
1988 -0.3359 
1980-
1984 -0.2963 
1984-
1988 -0.4789*** 
1980-
1988 -0.4775*** 
Significance Levels 
*10% 
**5% 
***1% 
High CB Low CB 
Coverage Coverage 
0.1 160 0.0825 
0.2740 -0.6024*** 
-0.3370 0.5467*** 
-0.0552 0.0553 
0.2607 0.1 339 
-0.4317** 0.2105 
0.1665 0.0538 
-0.4076 0.1774 
-0.3952 -0.0526 
-0.5544*** -0.1 175 
-0.5325*** -0.0655 
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TABLE 12 
Correlations Coefficients on Hourly Pay and Productivity 
Using Data for 15 2-digit Manufacturing Industries -
disaggregated by high and low collective bargaining coverage 
Association between Pay Changes and Labour Productivity Changes 
Period Overall 
Correlation 
1980-
1984 -0.1360 
1984-
1988 0.1 1 25 
1980-
1988 -0.1875 
Significance Levels 
*10% 
**5% 
***1% 
Correlation in Correlations in 
Industries with those Industries 
Above Average with Below 
CB Coverage Average CB 
Coverage 
-0.2550 0.0931 
0.2758 -0.7947*** 
0.1046 -0.5255** 
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TABLE 13 
Correlation Coefficients of Original Level of Hourly Pay 
on Changes in Employment and Pay for 20 2-digit Industries -
disaggregated by high and low collective bargaining coverage 
Years 
1980-1984 
1984-1988 
1980-1988 
Years 
1980-1984 
1984-1988 
1980-1988 
Significance levels 
* 10% 
** 5% 
*** 1% 
Employment Sectors with 
Changes and Above Average 
Average Hourly CB Coverage 
Pay Level 
0.4002* 0.3960* 
0.1508 0.2717 
0.4379** 0.4984*** 
Hourly Pay Sectors with 
Changes and Above Average 
Original Level CB Coverage 
-0.2292 -0.2567 
-0.7712*** -0.7955*** 
-0.7710*** -0.8610*** 
- 79 -
Sectors 
with Below 
Average 
CB 
Coverage 
0.2701 
-0.8182*** 
-0.6037*** 
Sectors 
with Below 
Average 
CB 
Coverage 
-0.2302 
-0.2037 
-0.3093 
TABLE 14 
Minimum Wage Relative to Average Wage, Hourly Data 
Time Period or Industry Minimum Wage/Average Wage (%) 
1 Mean Across 20 Industries 
1980 32.2 
1981 30.2 
1982 29.4 
1983 28.9 
1984 27.8 
1985 26.9 
1986 26.4 
1987 25.8 
1988 25.6 
Average 1980-88 28.2 
2 Mean Over 9 Years by Industry 
1 1  21.3 
15 17.8 
21 24.6 
22 23.0 
24 30.4 
25 21.8 
31 26.4 
33 25.7 
36 23.7 
41  29.0 
43 36.4 
45 41.1  
46 40.0 
47 26.8 
- 80 -
2 
Source: 
TABLE 14 continued 
Time Period or Industry Minimwn Wage/Average Wage (%) 
Mean Over 9 Years by Industry 
48 26.7 
50 32.0 
61 32.1 
66 40.5 
72 34.9 
81 8.8 
Average Over 20 Industries 28.2 
Industry average wage data: as Section II.2. 
Minimwn wages: Table SMI-I, Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales, Ministerio 
de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 
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TABLE 15 
Correlations Coefficients on the Bite of Minimum Wages and 
Employment Using Data for 20 and 33 2-digit Industries 
Association between employment changes and changes in the bite 
of the minimum wage defined as national minimum wage/average 
wage by industry 
Period Usiog Hourly Pay 
Data and National 
Mioimum Daily 
Pay, n=20 
1981 -0.1154 
1982 0.1544 
1983 0.0345 
1984 0.0179 
1985 -0.2017 
1986 0.2332 
1987 -0.1211  
1988 0.3349 
1980-1984 0.2865 
1984-1988 0.4843-*-
1980-1988 0.5159*** 
Significance Levels 
'10% 
'*5% 
***1% 
Period Usiog Monthly 
Pay Data and 
National Mioimum 
Monthly Pay, n=33 
1982 -0.0019 
1983 -0.0515  
1984 0.3565** 
1985 0.2571 
1986 0.1173 
1987 0.2326 
1988 -0.1 1 1 1  
1989 0.0428 
1990 -0.0738 
1991 0.3138*-
1981-1986 0.0014 
1986-1991 0.1416 
1981-1991 -0.2323 
- 82 -
FIGURE 1 
Bargaining Coverage and Levels 1977-1991 
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FIGURE 2 
Bargaining Coverage and Registered Unemployment 1977-1992 
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FIGURE 3 
Bargaining Coverage and Real Wages 1977-1991 
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FIGURE 4 
Bargaining Coverage and the Okun Index 1977-1991 
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FIGURE 5 
Bargaining Coverage and Industrial Action 1977-1991 
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APPENDIX 1 
Matched Industry Details 
1980·1988 Employment/Pay Correlations · 20 2·digit industries 
Spanish English MLH 
Extracci6n preparaci6n y Coal extraction and I I  
aglomer de combus. s6lidos manufacture of solid fuels 
y coquerias 
Electricidad gas y agua Electricity, gas and water 15 
supply 
Extracci6n de minerales Extraction of minerals 21 
Producci6n y primera Production and primary 22 
transformaci6n de metales transformation of metals 
Industrias de productos Non·metaIlic mineral 24 
minerales no metaIicos industry 
Industria qufmica Chemical industry 25 
Fabricaci6n de productos Construction of metal 3 1 -32 
metaIicos y construcci6n de products and construction 
maquinaria y equipo of mechanical equipment 
mecaruco and machines 
Construcci6n de maquinaria Construction of electrical 33-35 
y material electrico y machines and materials 
construcci6n de maquinas de and construction of 
oficina y material electr6nico electronic office machines 
and materials 
Construcci6n de vehlculos Cars and spare parts and 36-38 
autom6viles y sus piezas de naval and other transport 
repuesto y construcci6n materials 
naval y otro material de 
transporte 
- 89 -
Industrias de productos Food, drink and tobacco 41-42 
alimenticios bebidas y tabaco 
Industria textil Textiles 43 
Industrias del calzado, Footwear and clothing 45 
vestido y otras confecciones 
textiles 
Industrias de la madera, Timber, cork and wooden 46 
corcho y muebles de madera furniture 
Industrias del papel y fabric. Paper and paper products 47 
de art. de papel, Artes 
Graficas y edici6n 
Industrias de transformaci6n Processing of rubber and 48-49 
del caucho y materias plastic materials and other 
plasticas y otras indus trias manufacturing industries 
manufactureras 
Construcci6n Construction 50 
Comercio al por mayor Wholesale distribution, 61-65 
interm. comerc. y scrap and waste metals, 
recuperaci6n de productos y commission agents and 
comercio al por menor retail distribution 
Restaurantes, cafes, Restaurants, cafes and 66 
hostelerla hotels 
Otros transportes terrestres Other inland transport 72 
Instituciones financieras y Banking, finance, 81-85 
seguros, inmobilarias. insurance, business, 
Servicios a las empresas. services 
Alquileres 
- 90-
1980-88 Productivity/Pay Data: 15 2-digit industries 
Spanish English MLH 
Extracci6n preparaci6n y Coal extraction and 1 1  
aglomer de combus s6lidos y manufacture of solid fuels 
coquerias 
Electricidad gas y agua Electricity, gas and water 15 
supply 
Extracci6n de minerales Extraction of minerals 2 1  
Producci6n y primera Production and primary 22 
transformaci6n de metales transformation of metals 
Industrias de productos Non-metallic mineral 24 
minerales no metaIicos industry 
Industria quimica Chemical industry 25 
Fabricaci6n de productos Construction of metal 31-32 
metaIicos y construcci6n de products and construction 
maquinaria y equipo of mechanical equipment 
mecamco and machines 
Construcci6n de maquinaria Construction of electrical 33-35 
y material electrico y machines and materials 
construcci6n de maquinas de and construction of 
oficina y material electr6nico electronic office machines 
and materials 
Construcci6n de vehiculos Cars and spare parts and 36-38 
autom6viles y sus piezas de naval and other transport 
repuesto y construcci6n materials 
naval y otro material de 
transporte 
Industrias de productos Food, drink and tobacco 41-42 
alimenticios bebidas y tabaco 
Industria textil Textiles 43 
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Industrias del calzado, Footwear and clothing 45 
vestido y otras confecciones 
textiles 
Industrias de la madera, Timber, cork and wooden 46 
corcho y muebles de madera furniture 
Industrias del papel y fabric. Paper and paper products 47 
de art. de papel, Artes 
Graficas y edici6n 
Industrias de transformaci6n Processing of rubber and 48-49 
del caucho y materias plastic materials and other 
plasticas y otras industrias manufacturing industries 
manufactureras 
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APPENDIX 2 
Data Sources 
Employment Data 
Employees in employment (asalariados) by industry. 
33 classifications (matched to 20 pay and 1 5  value added 
classifications). 
Annual 1980-1991 (matched to 1980-88 pay and value added data). 
Source: Table 16, Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa, Boletin de 
Estadisticas Laborales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. 
Value Added Data 
Value added by industry. 
26 classifications (matched to 15 pay and employment classifications). 
Annual 1980-1989 (matched to 1980-88 pay and employment data). 
Source: Cap. IX, 2.1.  7 ,(Valor afiadido) Anuario Estadfstico. 
Pay Data 
Average hourly pay by industry. 
23 classifications (matched to 15  value added classifications and 20 
employment classifications). 
Annual 1980-1988. 
Source: Encuesta de Salarios en la Industria y Servicios, Instituto 
Nacional de Estadfstica 
Collective Bargaining Data 
Workers covered by collective bargaining by industry (all agreements). 
Classifications 33. 
Annual 1981-1991. 
Source: Table Con-IS, Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales Ministerio 
de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. 
- 93 -
Minimum Wages Data 
Daily and monthly minimum wage (salario minimo interprofesional) 
for 1 8  years old and above. 
Annual 1980-1993. 
Source: Table SMI-l, Boletfn de Estadfsticas Laborales, Ministerio de 
Trabajo y Seguridad Social. 
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